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ARTICLES 
Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy 
Daniel J. Solove* 
Journalists, politicians, jurists, and legal academics often describe the 
privacy problem created by the collection and use of personal information 
through computer databases and the Internet with the metaphor of Big Brother—
the totalitarian government portrayed in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.  
Professor Solove argues that this is the wrong metaphor.  The Big Brother 
metaphor as well as much of the law that protects privacy emerges from a 
longstanding paradigm for conceptualizing privacy problems.  Under this 
paradigm, privacy is invaded by uncovering one’s hidden world, by surveillance, 
and by the disclosure of concealed information.  The harm caused by such 
invasions consists of inhibition, self-censorship, embarrassment, and damage to 
one’s reputation.  Privacy law has developed with this paradigm in mind, and 
consequently, it has failed to grapple effectively with the database problem.  
Professor Solove argues that the Big Brother metaphor merely reinforces this 
paradigm and that the problem is better captured by Franz Kafka’s The Trial.  
Understood with the Kafka metaphor, the problem is the powerlessness, 
vulnerability, and dehumanization created by the assembly of dossiers of 
personal information where individuals lack any meaningful form of 
participation in the collection and use of their information.  Professor Solove 
illustrates that conceptualizing the problem with the Kafka metaphor has 
profound implications both for the law of information privacy and for choosing 
legal approaches to solve the problem. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We are in the midst of an information revolution, and we are only 
beginning to understand its implications.  In the past decade, we have 
undergone a dramatic transformation in the way we shop, bank, and go about 
our daily business—changes that have resulted in an unprecedented 
proliferation of records and data.1  The small details that were once captured in 
dim memories or fading scraps of paper are now preserved forever in the 
digital minds of computers, vast databases with fertile fields of personal data.  
Our wallets are stuffed with ATM cards, calling cards, frequent shopper cards, 
and credit cards —all of which can be used to record where we are and what we 
do.  Every day, rivulets of information stream into electric brains to be sifted, 
sorted, rearranged, and combined in hundreds of different ways.  Technology 
enables the preservation of the minutia of our everyday comings and goings, of 
our likes and dislikes, of who we are and what we own.  Companies are 
constructing gigantic databases of psychological profiles, amassing data about 
an individual’s race, gender, income, hobbies, and purchases.  It is ever more 
possible to create an electronic collage that covers much of a person’s life—a 
life captured in records, a digital biography composed in the collective 
computer networks of the world. 
Since their creation, computer databases have been viewed as problematic 
—a fear typically raised under the mantra of “privacy.”2  Databases certainly 
 
1. Although the transformation started in the mid-twentieth century, it began to reach a 
new level of maturity since the rise of the Internet in the 1990s. 
2. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN & M ICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: 
COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING, AND PRIVACY 3-5 (1972) (discussing debates over computer 
databases and privacy in the 1960s).  Indeed, long before the advent of the computer 
database, Justice Brandeis prophesized: “Ways may some day be developed by which the 
government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and 
by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.”  
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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present a privacy problem, but what exactly is the nature of that problem?  
Although the problem of databases is understood as one of concern over 
privacy, beyond this, the problem is often not well defined.  How much weight 
should our vague apprehensions be given, especially considering the 
tremendous utility, profit, and efficiency of using databases?  The answer to 
this question depends upon how the privacy problem of databases is 
conceptualized.  Unfortunately, so far, the problem has not been adequately 
articulated. 
Journalists,3 politicians,4 and jurists5 often describe the problem created by 
databases with the metaphor of Big Brother—the harrowing totalitarian 
government portrayed in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.6  For 
example, in 1974, when the use of computer databases was in its infancy, 
Justice Douglas observed: 
With dossiers being compiled by commercial credit bureaus, state and local 
law enforcement agencies, the CIA, the FBI, the IRS, the Armed Services, and 
the Census Bureau, we live in an Orwellian age in which the computer has 
become “the heart of a surveillance system that will turn society into a 
transparent world.”7 
Legal academics similarly characterize the problem.8  In The Culture of 
 
3. See, e.g., William Branigin, Employment Database Proposal Raises Cries of ‘“Big 
Brother,’” WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1995, at A17; James Gleick, Big Brother Is Us: Our Privacy 
is Disappearing, But Not by Force.  We’re Selling it, Even Giving it Away, N.Y. TIMES , 
Sept. 29, 1996, (magazine), at 130; Carey Goldberg, DNA Databanks Giving Police a 
Powerful Weapon, and Critics , N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1998, at A1 (“The very existence of a 
DNA database smacks more of a Big Brother-ish assault on privacy than the existence of the 
national computerized network of fingerprints, civil libertarians say.”). 
4. To respond to the computerization of records, in 1984 a House committee held 
hearings called “1984 and the National Security State.”  PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING 
PRIVACY 93 (1995); see also 140 CONG. REC. H9797, H9810 (statement of Rep. Kennedy) 
(concerning the Consumer Reporting  Reform Act of 1994, Senate Bill 783) (“For tens—if 
not hundreds—of  thousands of consumers, the promise of the information highway has 
given way to an Orwellian nightmare erroneous and unknowingly disseminated credit 
reports.”); Tod Robberson, Plan for Student Database Stirs Opposition in Fairfax,  WASH. 
POST, Jan. 9, 1997, at A1 (“‘This thing is Orwellian,’ said board member Carter S. Thomas 
(Springfield).  ‘It triples the amount of data that can be collected on individual students, 
teachers and even janitors.’”). 
5. See J. Roderick MacArthur Found. v. FBI, 102 F.3d 600, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(Tatel, J., dissenting) (“Congress passed the Privacy Act to give individuals some defenses 
against governmental tendencies towards secrecy and ‘Big Brother’ surveillance.’”); 
McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 220 (D.D.C. 1998) (“In these days of ‘big brother,’ 
where through technology and otherwise the privacy interests of individuals from all walks 
of life are being ignored or marginalized, it is imperative that statutes explicitly protecting 
these rights be strictly observed.”). 
6. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
7. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 96 n.2 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Arthur Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972). 
8. See infra, notes 133-144, and accompanying text; see also Charles N. Faerber, Book 
Versus Byte: The Prospects and Desirability of a Paperless Society, 17 J. M ARSHALL J. 
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Surveillance, William Staples observes that we have internalized Big Brother 
—we have created a Big Brother culture, where we all act as agents of 
surveillance and voyeurism.9  “The specter of Big Brother has haunted 
computerization from the beginning,” Abbe Mowshowitz observes.  
“Computerized personal record-keeping systems, in the hands of police and 
intelligence agencies, clearly extend the surveillance capabilities of the state.”10 
Even when not directly discussing Big Brother, commentators describe the 
problem in similar conceptual terms.  Paul Schwartz and Joel Reidenberg write: 
[Computer] data processing creates a potential for suppressing a capacity for 
free choice.  The more that is known about an individual, the easier it is to 
force his obedience.  Through the use of databanks, the state and private 
organizations can transform themselves into omnipotent parents and the rest 
of society into helpless children.11 
Commentators have adapted the Big Brother metaphor to describe the 
threat to privacy caused by private sector databases, often referring to private 
sector entities as “Little Brothers.”12  As David Lyon puts it:  “Orwell’s 
 
COMPUTE R & INFO. L. 797, 798 (1999) (“Many are terrified of an Orwellian linkage of 
databases allowing any individual to leave home without a wallet or purse but with a retinal 
pattern or other biometric identifier and then to perform any conceivable financial or 
documentary transaction.”); Bryan S. Schultz, Electronic Money, Internet Commerce, and 
the Right to Financial Privacy: A Call for New Federal Guidelines , 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 
797 (1999) (“As technology propels America toward a cashless marketplace where financial 
transactions are conducted with the aid of computer record-keeping, society inches closer to 
fulfilling George Orwell’s startling vision of a nation where ‘Big Brother’ monitors the who, 
what, where, when, and how of every individual’s life.”); Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the 
Workplace: How Well Does American Law Reflect American Values, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
271, 273 (1996) (stating that Americans would view the idea of government data protection 
boards to regulate private sector databases as “calling on ‘Big Brother’ to protect citizens 
from ‘Big Brother.’”); Wendy Wuchek, Conspiracy Theory: Big Brother Enters the Brave 
New World of Health Care Reform, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 293, 303 (2000).  In 1999, 
the University of Chicago Law School hosted a conference entitled 1984: Orwell and Our 
Future. 
9. WILLIAM G. STAPLES, THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE: DISCIPLINE AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES 129-134 (1997). 
10. Abbe Mowshowitz, Social Control and the Network Marketplace, in COMPUTERS, 
SURVEILLANCE, AND  PRIVACY 79, 95-96 (David Lyon & Elia Zureik eds., 1996). 
11. PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 39 (1996); see 
also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector 
Regulation in the United States , 80 IOWA L. REV. 553,  560 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz, 
Privacy and Participation]. 
12. See, e.g., Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds: 
United States Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
357, 377 (2000) (describing privacy problem created by the private-sector as the “little 
brother” problem); Marsha Morrow McLauglin & Suzanne Vaupel, Constitutional Right of 
Privacy and Investigative Consumer Reports: Little Brother Is Watching You, 2 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 773 (1975); Hon. Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of 
Privacy in Florida in the Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for 
Protection from Private and Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 27 (1997) 
(“In his book, 1984, we were warned by George Orwell to watch out for ‘Big Brother.’  
Today, we are cautioned to look out for ‘little brother’ and ‘little sister.’”); Thomas L. 
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dystopic vision was dominated by the central state.  He never guessed just how 
significant a decentralized consumerism might become for social control.”13  
“Today,” Paul Schwartz observes, “myriad Big and Little Brothers are involved 
in the collection and processing of personal data in the United States.”14  Katrin 
Byford writes: “Life in cyberspace, if left unregulated, thus promises to have 
distinct Orwellian overtones—with the notable difference that the primary 
threat to privacy comes not from government, but rather from the corporate 
world.”15  In his book, The End of Privacy, Reg Whitaker also revises the Big 
Brother narrative into one of a multitude of Little Brothers.16 
The use of the Big Brother metaphor to understand the database privacy 
problem is hardly surprising.  Big Brother has long been the metaphor of 
choice to characterize privacy problems, and it has frequently been invoked 
when discussing police search tactics,17 wiretapping and video surveillance,18 
and drug testing.19  With regard to computer databases, however, Big Brother 
 
Friedman, Foreign Affairs: Little Brother , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, Sec. 4 at 17; Wendy 
R. Leibowitz, Personal Privacy and High Tech: Little Brothers Are Watching You,  NAT’L 
L.J., Apr. 7, 1997, at B16. 
13. DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRIC EYE: THE RISE OF THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 78 
(1994). 
14. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1609, 1657 n.294 (1999). 
15. Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for 
the Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 50 
(1998). 
16. REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: HOW TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS BECOMING A 
REALITY 160-75 (1999). 
17. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting passage from Nineteen Eighty-Four to criticize the majority’s holding that viewing 
the defendant’s greenhouse from a low-flying helicopter was not a search); United States v. 
Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) rev’d 121 S. Ct. 2038 (Noonan, J., dissenting) 
(“The first reaction when one hears of the Agema 210 [thermal imaging device used to 
detect heat emissions from the home] is to think of George Orwell’s 1984.  Although the 
dread date has passed, no one wants to live in a world of Orwellian surveillance.”); 
Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 511 P.2d 33, 41 (Cal. 1973) (en banc) (“Surely our state and 
federal Constitutions and the cases interpreting them foreclose a regression into an Orwellian 
society. . . .”). 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994) (“It is clear that 
silent video surveillance, like the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications 
under Title I, results in a very serious, some say Orwellian, invasion of privacy.”); United 
States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that “indiscriminate 
video surveillance raises the spectre of the Orwellian state.”); United States v. Marion, 535 
F.2d 697, 698 (2d Cir. 1976) (Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 to “guard against the realization of Orwellian fears. . . .”); People v. 
Teicher, 422 N.E.2d 506, 513 (N.Y. 1981) (“Certainly the Orwellian overtones involved in 
this activity demand that close scrutiny be given to any application for a warrant permitting 
video electronic surveillance.”). 
19. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986) 
(stating that drug testing is “George Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ Society come to life”); Edward 
M. Chen, Pauline T. Kim, & John M. True, Common Law Privacy: A Limit on an 
Employer’s Power to Test for Drugs, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 651, 674 (1990) 
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is the wrong metaphor. 
In this article, I argue that the database problem cannot adequately be 
understood by way of the Big Brother metaphor—even when adapted to 
account for private sector databases.  Although the Big Brother metaphor 
certainly describes particular facets of the problem, it neglects many crucial 
dimensions.  This oversight is far from inconsequential, for the way we 
conceptualize a problem has important ramifications for law and policy.  I 
argue that the Big Brother metaphor as well as much of the law that protects 
privacy20 emerges from an older paradigm for conceptualizing privacy 
problems.  Under this paradigm, privacy is invaded by uncovering one’s hidden 
world, by surveillance, and by the disclosure of concealed information.  The 
harm caused by such invasions consists of inhibition, self-censorship, 
embarrassment, and damage to one’s reputation.  Privacy law has developed 
with this paradigm in mind, and consequently, it has failed to adapt to grapple 
effectively with the database problem.  The Big Brother metaphor merely 
reinforces this old paradigm, and impedes our understanding of the problem. 
I argue that the problem is best captured by Franz Kafka’s depiction of 
bureaucracy in The Trial21—a more thoughtless process of bureaucratic 
indifference, arbitrary errors, and dehumanization, a world where people feel 
powerless and vulnerable, without any meaningful form of participation in the 
collection and use of their information. 
Generally, a metaphor is the use of one thing to represent or symbolize 
another.22  As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson observe in their 
groundbreaking analysis, metaphors are not mere linguistic embellishments or 
decorative overlays on experience; they are part of our conceptual systems and 
affect the way we interpret our experiences.23  Metaphor is not simply an act of 
description; it is a way of conceptualization. “The essence of metaphor,” write 
Lakoff and Johnson, “is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in 
terms of another.”24  Much of our thinking about a problem involves the 
metaphors we use. According to J. M. Balkin, “metaphoric models selectively 
describe a situation, and in so doing help to suppress alternative 
conceptions.”25  Metaphors do not just distort reality but compose it; the 
“power [of metaphors] stems precisely from their ability to empower 
 
(characterizing drug testing as “George Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ Society come to life”). 
20. I will refer to this diverse body of law generally as “privacy law.”  Privacy law 
consists of an interrelated web of tort law, constitutional law, evidentiary privileges, contract 
law,  property law, state and federal statutory law, and criminal law. 
21. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1937). 
22. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, a “metaphor” is “[o]ne thing 
conceived as representing another; a symbol.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1104 
(4th ed. 2000).  An “analogy” is a more direct similarity between things: “Similarity in some 
respects between things that are otherwise dissimilar.” Id. at 64. 
23. GEORGE LAKOFF & M ARK JOHNSON, M ETAPHORS WE LIVE BY 145-46 (1980). 
24. Id. at 5. 
25. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 247 (1998). 
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understanding by shaping and hence limiting it.”26 
The Big Brother metaphor is definitely effective at capturing certain 
privacy problems, but not all privacy problems are the same.  I argue that the 
metaphor fails to capture the most important dimension of the database 
problem: the nature of our relationships with public and private bureaucracy 
and the effects of these relationships on human dignity and freedom.  We live 
today in a world largely controlled by public and private bureaucracies, 
affecting our communication, entertainment, health care, employment, 
education, transportation, and culture.  These institutions structure our lives in 
the modern state, and our freedom is implicated in our relationships to them. 
Databases alter the way the bureaucratic process makes decisions and 
judgments affecting our lives; and they exacerbate and transform existing 
imbalances in power within our relationships with bureaucratic institutions.  
This is the central dimension of the database privacy problem, and it is best 
understood with the Kafka metaphor. 
As John Dewey aptly said, “a problem well put is half-solved.”27  “The 
way in which the problem is conceived,” Dewey elaborated, “decides what 
specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; what data are 
selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of 
hypotheses and conceptual structures.”28  Understanding the problem in light of 
the Kafka metaphor reveals systematic deficiencies across the spectrum of 
privacy law in addressing the special nature of the problem of databases.  
Further, understanding the problem with the Kafka metaphor reveals significant 
difficulties in the solutions proposed by the existing discourse on information 
privacy. 
Part II provides a background into the problem of databases.  Part III 
discusses and critiques how the Big Brother metaphor structures how the 
database problem is currently conceptualized within the emerging discourse of 
information privacy.  Part IV looks more broadly at the implications for 
privacy law of understanding the problem in terms of the Kafka metaphor. 
 
26. Id. at 248. 
27. JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 108 (1938). 
28. Id. 
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II.  THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION 
What is the nature and extent of the database privacy problem?  Almost all 
of us are aware that our personal information is being collected and stored by 
many different entities.  Many view this with great concern, although they find 
it difficult to articulate what the concern entails. This article aims to articulate 
that concern in a useful way.  Before discussing the database problem 
conceptually, I will provide some background into the current methods of 
information collection and the existing and potential uses of databases.  This 
Part will chronicle the history of record-keeping and databases in the United 
States in order to understand the motivating forces behind these practices and 
shed light on their future development. 
The history of record-keeping and databases in the United States reveals 
some important points that I will highlight at the outset.  First, the 
developments in record-keeping were not orchestrated according to a grand 
scheme but were largely ad hoc, arising as technology interacted with the 
demands of the growing public and private bureaucracies.  Second, the goals of 
data collection have often been rather benign—or at least far less malignant 
than the aims of Big Brother.  In fact, personal information has been collected 
and recorded for a panoply of purposes.  The story of record keeping and 
database production is, in the end, not a story about the progression toward a 
world ruled by Big Brother or a multitude of Little Brothers.  Instead, it is a 
story about a group of different actors with different purposes attempting to 
thrive in an increasingly information-based society. 
A.   Public Sector Databases 
Although personal records have been kept for centuries,29 only in 
contemporary times has the practice become a serious concern.  In earlier 
times, communities were much smaller and people knew each other’s business.  
Personal information was preserved in the memories of friends, family, and 
neighbors, and spread by gossip and storytelling.  Few public records were 
collected, and most of them were kept at a very local level, often by institutions 
associated with churches.30  During the late 19th century, record-keeping by 
state and local governments became increasingly prevalent.31 
The federal government’s early endeavors at collecting data consisted 
mainly in its responsibility of conducting the census.  The first census in 1790 
 
29. For example, in the 11th century, William the Conquerer collected information 
about his subjects for taxation in the Doomsday Book. REGAN, supra note 4, at 69. 
30. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH,  BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM 
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 12 (2000). 
31. Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. RE V. 
1892, 1906-07 (1981). 
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was basically just a head-count, asking only four questions.32  With each 
proceeding census, more personal information was collected.  In 1830, two 
personal questions were asked—whether the individual was deaf or blind.33  By 
1860, 142 questions were asked.34  When the 1890 census included questions 
about diseases, disabilities, and finances, it sparked a public outcry by the 
press, leading to the passage in the early twentieth century of stricter laws 
protecting the confidentiality of census data.35 
One of the next significant steps in federal personal information record-
keeping was the creation of a federal tax system.  Tax records, containing 
financial information, began to be kept during the early twentieth century, and in 
the 1920s and 1930s, Congress occasionally flirted with requiring the public 
disclosure of information in these records.36 
It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that information 
collection began to flourish.  The creation and growth of government 
bureaucracy—spawning well over 100 federal agencies within the past 
century—has led to an overwhelming increase in the collection and use of data. 
The expansion of the bureaucratic network of regulation, licensing, and 
entitlements in the 1930s, 40s and 50s resulted in an insatiable thirst for 
information about individuals.37  One example was the Social Security System, 
created in 1935, which assigned nine-digit numbers to each citizen and required 
extensive record-keeping of each employed individual’s earnings.38 
Technology was one of the primary factors in the rise of information 
collection. The 1880 census required almost 1500 clerks to tally information 
tediously, by hand—and it took seven years to complete.39  At the rapid rate of 
population growth, if a faster way could not be found to tabulate the 
information, the 1890 census would not be completed before the 1900 census 
began.  Fortunately, just in time for the 1890 census, a census official named 
 
 32. See REGAN, supra note 4, at 46. 
33. See SMITH, supra note 30, at  58. 
34. See REGAN, supra note 4, at 46. 
35. See id. at 47. 
36. Congress provided varying protection for the confidentiality of tax records.  In 
1924, Congress required the public disclosure of taxpayer income, but then repealed the 
requirement two years later.  In 1934, Congress once again required this disclosure—by 
making taxpayers submit a form called a “pink slip” which contained name, address, gross 
income, deductions, net income, credit against net income, and tax payable.  The law was 
repealed a year later.  ERIK LARSON, THE NAKED CONSUMER: HOW OUR PRIVATE LIVES 
BECOME PUBLIC COMMODITIES 10 (1992). 
37. See WESTIN & BAKER, supra note 2, at 220-23.  For a discussion of the expansion 
of government entitlements and licensing, see Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE 
L.J. 733, 733-37 (1964). 
38. For a general introduction to Social Security numbers, see SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION, YOUR NUMBER AND CARD (1999), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10002.html. 
39. MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY & WILLIAM ASPRAY, COMPUTER: A HISTORY OF THE 
INFORMATION M ACHINE 21 (1996). 
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Herman Hollerith developed an innovative tabulating device—a machine that 
read holes punched in cards.40  With Hollerith’s new machine, the 1890 census 
was tabulated in under three years.41  Hollerith left the Census Bureau and 
founded a small firm that developed his punched-card machines—a firm that 
through a series of mergers eventually formed the company that became 
IBM.42 
IBM’s subsequent rise to prosperity was due, in significant part, to the 
government’s increasing need for data.  The Social Security System and the 
New Deal programs required a vast increase in records that had to be kept by 
both the public and private sectors.  As a result, the government became one of 
the largest purchasers of IBM’s punching machines.43  The Social Security 
Board kept most of its records on punch cards, and by 1943 it had more than 
100 million cards in storage.44 
The advent of the mainframe computer in 1946 revolutionized information 
collection.  The computer and magnetic tape enabled the systematic storage of 
data.  As computer processing speeds accelerated, and as computer memory 
ballooned, computers provided a vastly increased ability to collect, search, 
analyze, copy, and transfer records. 
Federal and state agencies were among the first to computerize their 
records. The Census Bureau was one of the earliest purchasers of commercially 
available computers.45  Social Security numbers—which originally were not 
designed to be used as identifiers beyond the social security system46—became 
immensely useful for computer databases.  In the 1970s, federal, state, and 
local governments—as well as the private sector—increasingly began to use 
them as identifiers.47 
 
40. SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 17-18 (2000). 
41. CAMPBELL-KELLY & ASPRAY, supra note 39, at 26. 
42. Id. at 44-52; GARFINKEL, supra note 40, at 18. 
43. See CAMPBELL-KELLY & ASPRAY, supra note 39, at 52. 
44. GARFINKEL, supra note 40, at 19. 
45. ARTHUR R. M ILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND 
DOSSIERS 55 (1971). 
46. PHILIPPA STRUM, PRIVACY: THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1945, at 46 
(1998). 
47. Id. at 47. In the 1960s and 1970s, Social Security numbers began to be used for 
taxpayer identification numbers, motor vehicle registration, drivers’ licenses, and identifiers 
for other programs. CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 52 (1999). In 1984, Congress 
required all holders of bank accounts to provide their Social Security numbers to their banks 
so the IRS could better monitor finances.  Id.  A recent study by the United States General 
Accounting Office documents the current widespread use of Social Security numbers.  See 
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
GOVERNMENT M ANAGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY, COMMITTEE ON 
GOVERNMENT REFORM, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GAO/T-HEHS-00-120, SOCIAL 
SECURITY: GOVERNMENT AND OTHER USES OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER ARE 
WIDESPREAD (May, 2000).  For a listing of the increasing authorized uses of Social Security 
numbers, see GARFINKEL, supra note 40, at 33-34. 
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Today, federal agencies and departments maintain almost 2000 
databases,48 including records pertaining to immigration, bankruptcy, Social 
Security, military personnel, as well as countless other matters.  In a recent 
effort to track down parents who fail to pay child support, the federal 
government has created a vast database consisting of information about all 
people who obtain a new job anywhere in the nation.  The database contains 
their Social Security numbers, addresses, and wages.49 
States maintain public records of arrests, births, criminal proceedings, 
marriages, divorces, property ownership, voter registration, workers 
compensation, and scores of other types of records.  State licensing regimes 
mandate that records be kept on numerous professionals such as doctors, 
lawyers, engineers, insurance agents, nurses, police, accountants, and teachers. 
States are also creating DNA databases about individuals.  States have 
been constructing databases of their felons and placing them on the Internet.50  
Many states maintain sexual offender DNA databases.51  Some states are in the 
process of expanding their databases to include the genetic information of a 
greater range of felons.52  DNA databases are not merely limited to criminals.  
The military maintains a DNA database to identify remains of missing 
soldiers.53  Recently, Iceland sold a database containing the genetic 
information of its entire population to a biotechnology company.54 
B.   Private Sector Databases 
The rise of databases was driven not only by the public sector’s expanding 
regulatory system, but also by the private sector’s increasing competition in 
marketing and advertising. 
 
 
48. See BETH GIVENS & THE PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE , THE PRIVACY RIGHTS 
HANDBOOK: HOW TO TAKE CONTROL OF YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION 116 (1997) 
49. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).  See generally Robert O’ Harrow, Jr., Uncle 
Sam Has All Your Numbers: Huge Net for Deadbeat Dads Catches Privacy Criticism, 
WASH. POST, June 27, 1999, at A1 (describing the “vast computerized data-monitoring 
system” used for child support enforcement). 
50. Currently, these databases are used only for identification purposes, and only a 
very small portion of an individual’s DNA is used. 
51. Craig Timberg, Virginia Lists Sex Offenders on Internet, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 
1998, at A1. 
52. See, e.g., Amy Argetsinger & Craig Whitlock, Md. Seeks the DNA of Violent 
Criminals: Critics Cite Threat to Privacy Rights , WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1999, at B1 
(discussing Maryland plan to “collect the genetic fingerprints of almost every violent 
felon”). 
53. SYKES, supra note 47, at 128. 
54. John Schwartz, For Sale in Iceland: A Nation’s Genetic Code: Deal with Research 
Firm Highlights Conflicting Views of Progress, Privacy and Ethics, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 
1999, at A1. 
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Long before the rise of nationwide advertising campaigns there was a 
personal relationship between merchant and customer.  Local merchants lived 
next door to their customers and learned about their lives from their existence 
together in the community.  To a large extent, marketing was done locally—by 
the peddler on the street or the shopkeeper on the corner.  Mass marketing, 
which began in the nineteenth century and flourished in the twentieth century, 
transformed the nature of selling from personal one-to-one persuasion to large-
scale advertising campaigns designed for the nameless, faceless American 
consumer. 
Mass marketing consumed vast fortunes, and advertisements captured only 
a limited percentage of those exposed to them.  Soon marketers discovered the 
power of a new form of marketing—targeted marketing, directed to discrete 
individuals or groups. 
The sales department of General Motors Corporation began one of the 
early experiments with targeted marketing in the 1920s.  Through research, it 
discovered that owners of Ford vehicles frequently did not purchase a Ford as 
their next vehicle—so it targeted owners of two-year-old Fords and sent them a 
brochure on GM vehicles.55  GM then began to send out questionnaires asking 
for consumer input into their products.  GM believed that this would be a good 
marketing device, presenting the image of a big corporation that cared enough 
to listen to the opinions of everyday people.56  GM cast itself as a democratic 
institution, its surveys demonstrating that it was “OF THE PEOPLE, FOR THE 
PEOPLE, BY THE PEOPLE.”57  One GM print advertisement depicted a 
delighted child holding up the survey letter exclaiming:  “Look dad, a letter 
from General Motors!”58  The campaign was quite successful—ironically not 
because of the data collected but because of the impression of GM as a 
company that was interested in the consumer’s opinions and ideas.  Despite 
GM’s rhetoric of listening to the consumer, GM’s engineers virtually ignored 
the surveys, claiming that the consumer views were naïve.59 
Things have come a long way.  Today, corporations are desperate for 
whatever consumer information they can glean, and their quest for such 
information is hardly perceived by the general public as democratic.  The data 
collected extends beyond information about consumer’s views of the product to 
information about the consumer herself, often including lifestyle details and 
even a full-scale psychological profile. 
The turn to targeting was spurred by the proliferation and specialization of 
 
55. Roland Marchand, Customer Research as Public Relations: General Motors in the 
1930s, in GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONSUMER SOCIETIES IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 85, 86 (Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, & Matthias Judt eds., 
1998). 
56. Id. at 92. 
57. Id. at 99. 
58. Id. at 109. 
 59. See id. at 105. 
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mass media throughout the century,60 enabling marketers to tap into groups of 
consumers with similar interests and tastes.  Selecting particular television or 
radio shows or specific magazines to place advertisements was the most basic 
form of targeting.  This technique, however, was only a variation of mass 
marketing. 
The most revolutionary developments in targeted marketing occurred in 
the direct marketing industry, consisting originally of companies that contacted 
consumers directly through the mail (often by mail order catalogs). The 
practice of sending catalogs directly to consumers began in the late nineteenth 
century when railroads extended the reach of the mail system.61  The industry 
also reached out to people by way of door-to-door salespersons.  In the 1970s, 
marketers began calling people directly on the telephone, and “telemarketing” 
was born. 
Direct marketing remained a fledgling practice and fringe form of 
marketing for most of the century.62  Direct marketers had long accepted the 
“two percent” rule—only two percent of those contacted would respond.63  
With such a staggering failure rate, direct marketing achieved its successes at 
great cost.  To increase the low response rate, marketers sought to sharpen their 
targeting techniques. This required more consumer research and an effective 
way to collect, store, and analyze information about consumers.  The advent of 
the computer database gave marketers this long sought after ability—and it 
launched a revolution in targeting technology. 
Databases provided an efficient way to store and search for data.  
Organized into fields of information, the database enabled marketers to sort by 
various types of information and to rank or select various groups of individuals 
from its master list of customers—a practice called “modeling.”64  Through 
this process, fewer mailings or calls needed to be made, resulting in a higher 
response rate and lower costs.65  In addition to isolating a company’s most 
profitable customers, marketers studied them, profiled them, and then used that 
profile to hunt for similar customers.66  This, of course, demanded not only 
information about existing customers, but the collection of data about 
prospective customers as well. 
 
60. In 1950, for example, there were 700 radio stations.  In 1984, there were 9000. 
CHESTER A. SWENSON, SELLING TO A SEGMENTED M ARKET: THE LIFESTYLE APPROACH xvi 
(1990).  In 1989, there were 2192 consumer magazines and 5000 business publications.  Id. 
61. ARTHUR M. HUGHES, THE COMPLETE DATABASE MARKETER: SECOND-GENERATION 
STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR TAPPING THE POWER OF YOUR CUSTOMER DATABASE 51 
(2d ed. 1996). 
62. Id. (“But for most of the twentieth century, catalog marketing was always 
considered a backwater, an aberration, an obscure method for unloading second-class goods 
on rural people.”). 
63. Id. at 57. 
64. See id. at 278-88. 
65. See id. at 285. 
 66. See id. at 267-68. 
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Originally, marketers sought to locate the best customers by identifying 
those customers who purchased items most recently, who had the most frequent 
number of purchases, and who spent the most money.67  In 1967 when the 
postal system began using the five-digit zip code, direct marketers began to 
isolate responses by zip code to determine the best areas to market to.68  Direct 
marketers could then send mailings to those zip codes with the greatest 
response rates.  This information, however, was based merely on a company’s 
own sales data. 
The turn to demographic information in the 1970s69 enabled marketers to 
profile potential consumers.  Demographics included basic information such as 
age level, income level, race, ethnicity, gender, and geographical location.  
Marketers could target certain demographic segments of the nation, a practice 
called “cluster marketing.”  It worked because people with similar incomes and 
races generally lived together in clusters. 
The private sector obtained this demographic information from the federal 
government.  By the 1970s, the United States had begun selling its census data 
on magnetic tapes.70  To protect privacy, the Census Bureau sold the 
information on computer tapes in clusters of 1500 households, supplying only 
addresses—not names.71  This privacy protection measure was thwarted when 
companies such as Donnelley, MetroMail, and R.L. Polk reattached the names 
by matching the addresses with information in telephone books and voter 
registration lists.72  Within five years of purchasing the census data, these 
companies had constructed demographically segmented databases of over half 
of the households in the nation.73 
In the 1980s, marketers looked to supplement their data about consumers 
by compiling “psychographic” information—data about psychological 
characteristics such as opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and lifestyle. 74  In the 
vanguard of collecting psychographic data were clustering companies that had 
previously relied upon more basic demographic data.  For example, one 
company established an elaborate taxonomy of people, with category names 
such as “Blue Blood Estates,” “Bohemian Mix,” “Young Literati,” “Shotguns 
and Pickups,” and “Hispanic Mix.”75  For each cluster, there is a description of 
 
 67. See id. at 156. 
68. DICK SHAVER, THE NEXT STEP IN DATABASE M ARKETING: CONSUMER GUIDED 
MARKETING: PRIVACY TO YOUR CUSTOMERS, RECORD PROFITS FOR YOU 27 (1996). 
69. CLIFF ALLEN, DEBORAH KANIA, & BETH YAECKEL, INTERNET WORLD GUIDE TO 
ONE-TO-ONE WEB M ARKETING: BUILD A RELATIONSHIP M ARKETING STRATEGY ONE 
CUSTOMER AT A TIME 3 (1998). 
70. LARSON, supra note 36, at 41; SHAVER, supra note 68, at 29. 
71. SHAVER,  supra note 68, at 29-32. 
72. Id. at 32. 
73. Id. 
74. See ALLEN, KANIA & YAECKEL, supra note 69, at 3; HUGHES,supra note 61, at 295. 
75. HUGHES,  supra note 61, at 298-99. 
 
 
July 2001] PRIVACY AND POWER                                               1407 
 
 
the type of person, their likes, incomes, race and ethnicity, attitudes, and 
hobbies.76 
These innovations in targeting technique have made targeted marketing—
or “database marketing” as it is often referred to today—the hottest form of 
marketing, growing at twice the rate of America’s gross national product.77  In 
1995, direct marketing resulted in $600 billion in sales.  The industry employed 
over eighteen million people.78  On average, over 500 pieces of unsolicited 
advertisements, catalogs, and marketing mailings arrive every year at each 
household.79  Due to targeting, direct mail yields $10 in sales for every $1 in 
cost—a ratio double that for a television advertisement—and forecasters 
predict catalog sales will grow faster than retail sales.80  Telemarketing is a 
$435 billion dollar a year industry.81  In a 1996 Gallup poll, 77 percent of 
United States companies used some form of direct mail, targeted email, or 
telemarketing.82 
The effectiveness and profitability of targeted marketing depend upon data, 
and the challenge is to obtain as much of it as possible.  Marketers discovered 
that they did not have to research and collect all the information from scratch, 
for data is the perspiration of the Information Age.  Billions of bytes are 
released each second as we click, charge, and call.  A treasure trove of 
information already lay untapped within existing databases, retail records, 
mailing lists, and government records.  All that marketers had to do was 
plunder it as secretly and efficiently as possible. 
The increasing thirst for personal information spawned the creation of a 
new industry: the database industry.  The database industry is an information 
age bazaar where personal data collections are bartered and sold.  List rental 
prices are calculated at a few cents to a dollar per name.83  Over 550 companies 
comprise the personal information industry, with annual revenues in the 
billions of dollars.84  The sale of mailing lists alone (not including the sales 
 
76. See id. at 300. 
77. Id. at 5. 
78. William J. Fenrich, Note, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in 
Personal Information, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 951, 956 (1996). 
79. Susan Headden, The Junk Mail Deluge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 8, 1997, 
at 40.  Junk mail sent to each home averages about thirty four pounds per year.  Id.  See also 
GIVENS, supra note 48, at 16. 
80. Headden, supra note 79. 
81. ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLIC 
ACCESS, 31 (1994). 
82. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER IDENTIFYING INFORMATION AND 
FINANCIAL FRAUD 7 (Mar. 1997). 
83. There are no precise figures, but most sources quote between three cents to one 
dollar per name.  See HUGHES, supra note 61, at  365 (twenty cents to one dollar per name); 
Headden, supra note 79, (three to twenty cents per name). 
84. Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age 
of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1162 (1997). 
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generated by the use of the lists) generates three billion dollars a year.85  The 
average consumer is on around 100 mailing lists and is contained in at least 
fifty databases.86 
An increasing number of companies with databases—magazines, credit 
card companies, stores, mail order catalog firms, and even telephone 
companies—are realizing that their databases are becoming one of their most 
valuable assets and are beginning to sell their data. 
Along with companies whose databases were an outgrowth of their 
business, a new breed of firms devotes their primary business to the collection 
of personal information.  Catalina Marketing Corporation, for example, 
maintains supermarket buying history databases on 30 million households from 
more than 5000 stores.87  Aristotle Industries, Inc. markets a database of the 
names, addresses, and voting records of 118 million of America’s 128 million 
registered voters.88 
The most powerful database builders construct information empires, 
sometimes with information on more than half of the American population.  
For example, Donnelly Marketing Information Services keeps track of 125 
million people.89 Wiland Services has constructed a database containing over 
1000 elements, from demographic information to behavioral data, on over 215 
million people.90  There are around five database compilers that have data on 
almost all households in the United States.91 
In addition to marketing databases, credit card companies and credit 
reporting agencies have also developed extensive personal information 
databases.  The use of general purpose credit cards greatly expanded during the 
1970s and 1980s,92 creating a detailed record of one’s purchases and lifestyle. 
The increasing mobility of people and the fact that creditors no longer 
knew one’s reputation in the community spawned the need for national credit 
reporting firms.93  Credit reporting companies evaluate people’s credit, rate 
each person, and sell this information to creditors.  For example, Experian, one 
of the largest credit reporting companies in the world,94 collects credit 
information on 205 million Americans.95  Credit reports contain financial 
 
85. Fenrich, supra note 78, at  956. 
 86. BRANSCOMB,  supra note 81, at 11. 
87. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Behind the Instant Coupons, a Data-Crunching 
Powerhouse, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at A20. 
88. LARSON,  supra note 36, at 218. 
89. Id. at 60. 
90. Id. 
91. HUGHES, supra note 61, at 354. 
92. STRUM, supra note 46, at 72-73. 
93. SMITH, supra note 30, at 314. 
94. There are three large credit reporting companies in the United States: Equifax, 
Experian (formerly TRW), and Trans Union. 
95. See EXPERIAN FACT SHEET, at http://www.experian.com/corporate/factsheet.html  
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information contained in public records such as bankruptcy filings, judgments 
and liens, as well as information relating to mortgage foreclosures, checking 
accounts, and a list of all companies that requested the individual’s credit file. 96  
Some companies also prepare investigative consumer reports, which 
supplement the credit report with information about an individual’s character 
and lifestyle.97  Credit reporting companies provide lists of people at certain 
income levels with good credit,98 which are then used to send people pre-
approved credit card offers.99 
In addition to credit card records, there are cable television records, video 
rental records, phone records, travel records, and so on. The Medical 
Information Bureau (MIB), a nonprofit institution, maintains a database of 
medical information on fifteen million individuals, which is available to over 
700 insurance companies.100 
 
C.  Cyberspace and Personal Information 
Cyberspace is the new frontier for marketing, and its power has only begun 
to be exploited.  The Internet is rapidly becoming the hub of the personal 
information market.  First, the Internet provides a much greater ability to 
aggregate and consolidate information.  Government agencies have begun to 
place records on their websites, and public records, once physically scattered 
across the country, can now be searched or gathered from anywhere in the 
country.  A group of Internet websites have compiled public records from 
across the country and sell the information online.  Companies such as 
KnowX.com and Locateme.com sell records pertaining to aircraft ownership, 
bankruptcy, death, registered pilots, judgments, liens, lawsuits, professional 
licenses, residences, real property foreclosures, property refinancing, driver 
registrations, voter registrations, and credit headers.101 
Second, the Internet has made the peddling and purchasing of data much 
easier. Acxiom.com is a website that collects and sells data on consumers.102  
In its “InfoBase,” it provides “[o]ver 50 demographic variables . . . including 
age, income, real property data, children’s data, and others.”  It contains data 
on education levels, occupation, height, weight, political affiliation, ethnicity, 
 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2001). 
 96. See http://www.econsumer.Equifax.com/webapp/ConsumerProducts/ 
pgOnlineSample.jsp for a sample credit report.  (last visited Apr. 12, 2001). 
97. See GIVENS, supra note 48, at 83. 
98. LARSON,  supra note 36, at 76. 
99. GIVENS, supra note 48, at 21. 
100. See, e.g., GARFINKEL, supra note 40, at 137; GIVENS, supra note 48, at 83 
(discussing investigative consumer reports). 
101. See http://www.knowx.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2001); 
http://www.locateme.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2001). 
102. http://www.acxiom.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2001). 
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race, hobbies, and net worth.  Focus USA’s website boasts that it has detailed 
information on 203 million people.103  Among its over 100 targeted mailing 
lists are lists of “Affluent Hispanics,” “Big-Spending Parents,” “First Time 
Credit Card Holders,” “Grown But Still At Home,” “Hi-Tech Seniors,” “New 
Homeowners,” “Status Spenders,” and “Waist Watchers.”104 
In addition to serving as a marketplace for personal information, 
cyberspace has provided a revolution for the targeted marketing industry, 
through profound targeting capabilities and effective methods for collecting 
personal information.  Advertisers spend millions of dollars on Internet 
advertising.  Internet ad spending was approximately $301 million in 1996,105 
and it leaped to about $1.9 billion in 1998.106  That figure rose to around $4 
billion in 1999.107 Over fifty percent  of the Fortune 500 companies have paid 
for advertisements on the Internet.108 
The Internet provides much greater targeting capabilities for advertisers.  
As one book for web advertisers boasts:  “The targeting that magazines give 
you over television is nothing compared to the targeting the Web gives you 
over magazines.”109  This revolution in targeting technology is possible 
because web pages are not static like magazine pages.  They are generated 
every time the user clicks.  Each page contains spaces reserved for 
advertisements and specific advertisements are download into those spots.110  
The dynamic nature of web pages makes it possible for a page to download 
different advertisements for different users. 
Targeting is very important for web advertising because a web page is 
cluttered with information and images all vying for the users’ attention.  
Whereas a television commercial is an orderly linear presentation of details, the 
web page places everything before the user at once.  Similar to the response 
rates of earlier efforts at direct marketing, only a small percentage of viewers 
(from 2%-3.5%) click the advertisements they view.111  The Internet’s greater 
targeting potential and the fierce competition for the consumer’s attention have 
given companies an unquenchable thirst for information about web users.  This 
information is useful in developing more targeted advertis ing as well as in 
enabling companies to better assess the performance and popularity of various 
 
103. http://www.focus-usa-1.com/lists_az.htm 
104. Id. 
105. See JIM STERNE, WHAT M AKES PEOPLE CLICK: ADVERTISING ON THE WEB 21 
(1997). 
106. Greg Farrell, Advertising on Internet Zooms: Industry Leaders See Web Snaring 
Target Market at Low Cost, USA TODAY, May 10, 1999, at B9. 
107. John Markoff, Sizing Up the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at C4 (graphic 
accompanying article Coming to Grips with the Web: Fast Changing Genie Alters the 
World). 
108. STERNE, supra note 105, at 14. 
109. Id. at 37. 
110. See id. at 69. 
111. See id. at 179. 
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parts of their web sites. 
Currently, there are two basic ways personal information is collected in 
cyberspace:  (1) by directly collecting information from users (registration and 
transactional data); and (2) by surreptitiously tracking the way people navigate 
through the Internet (clickstream data). 
The direct solicitation of information is widespread.  Websites collect both 
registration and transactional data.  Registration data is collected by those 
websites that request users to log in to access parts of the website.  
Transactional data is gleaned by websites engaging in business with users, such 
as selling merchandise or services.  For example, Amazon.com, one of the 
largest Internet merchants, keeps track of its customers’ purchases in books, 
CDs, electronics, toys, and other items. 
Websites can also secretly track a customer’s websurfing.  When a person 
explores a website, the website can record the Internet service provider, the 
type of computer and software used, the website linked from, the amount of 
time spent perusing each page, and exactly what parts of the website were 
explored and for how long.  This information is referred to as “clickstream 
data” because it is a trail of how a user navigates throughout the web by 
clicking on various links.  It enables the website to calculate how many times it 
has been visited and what parts are most popular.  With a way to connect this 
information to particular web users, marketers can gain a window into people’s 
minds.  This is a unique vision, for while marketers can measure the size of 
audiences for other media such as television, radio, books, and magazines, they 
have little ability to measure attention span.  Due to the interactive nature of the 
Internet, marketers can learn how we respond to what we hear and see.  A 
website collects information about the way a user interacts with the site and 
stores the information in its database.  This information will enable the website 
to learn about the interests of a user so it can better target advertisements to the 
user.  For example, Amazon.com could, if it desired, keep track of every book 
or item that a customer browsed but did not purchase. 
To connect this information with particular users, a company can either 
require a user to log in or it can secretly tag a user so that it recognizes the user 
when she returns.  This latter form of identification occurs through what is 
called a “cookie.”112  A cookie is a small text file of codes that is deployed into 
the user’s computer when she downloads a web page.  Web sites place a unique 
identification code into the cookie, and the cookie is saved on the user’s hard 
drive.  When the user visits the site again, the site looks for its cookie, 
recognizes the user, and locates the information it collected about the user’s 
previous surfing activity in its database.  Basically, a cookie works as a form of 
high-tech cattle-branding. 
 
 
112. Cookies are not used only for tracking or targeting purposes.  Cookies also have 
beneficial uses, such as storing passwords and identifying returning customers so they do not 
have to reenter information. 
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Cookies have certain limits.  First, they are not tagged to particular 
individuals—just to particular computers.  Second, websites can only read the 
cookies that they placed on a user’s computer; they cannot obtain cookies 
stored by a different website. 
Although cookies alone do not supply much information, companies have 
devised strategies of information sharing with other websites.  One of the most 
popular information sharing techniques is performed by a firm called 
DoubleClick.  Companies pay DoubleClick to distribute their advertisements.  
When a user clicks a company’s advertisement banner, a secret message is 
deployed to DoubleClick before the web page associated with the banner is 
downloaded.  The messages sent to DoubleClick enable it to keep track of 
which ads are being clicked and by whom.113  Once DoubleClick develops a 
profile of a user, it can scan through its subscribing companies’ advertisements 
and match them to the user based on the information it has gathered.114  As of 
the end of 1999, DoubleClick had amassed eighty million customer profiles.115 
“The time will come,” predicts one marketer, “when we are well known for 
our inclinations, our predilections, our proclivities, and our wants.  We will be 
classified, profiled, categorized, and our every click will be watched.”116  As 
we stand at the threshold of an age structured around information, we are only 
beginning to realize the extent to which our lives can be encompassed within 
its architecture.  As we live more of our lives on the Internet, we are also 
creating a permanent record of unparalleled pervasiveness and depth.  Indeed, 
almost everything on the Internet is being archived.  One company has even 
been systematically sweeping up all the data from the Internet and storing it in 
a vast electronic warehouse.117  Our online personas—captured, for instance, in 
our web pages and usenet postings—are swept up as well.  We are accustomed 
to information on the web quickly flickering in and out of existence, presenting 
the illusion that it is ephemeral.  But little on the Internet disappears or is 
forgotten, even when we delete or change the information.  The amount of 
personal information archived will only escalate as our lives are increasingly 
 
113. STERNE, supra note 1085, at 238. 
114. Id. at 241. 
115. Heather Green, Privacy Online: The FTC Must Act Now, BUS. WK.,, Nov. 29, 
1999, at 48. DoubleClick’s activities have come under increasing scrutiny.  In 1999, 
DoubleClick purchased Abacus Direct Corp., a direct marketing company maintaining a 
database on about ninety percent of United States households.  In re DoubleClick, Inc. 
Privacy Litigation, No. 00 CIV 0641 NRB, 2001 WL 303744, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 
2001).  To address the possibility that DoubleClick might merge its profiles with Abacus’s 
database, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initiated an investigation.  Id.  at *5-6.  In 
2000, DoubleClick announced that it was temporarily backing away from its plan to merge 
the data, and in January, 2001, the FTC ended its investigation.  Id. at *6.  Recently, a 
federal district court dismissed a class action against DoubleClick alleging, among other 
things, that DoubleClick’s use of cookies violated the Federal Wiretap Act.  Id. at *1. 
116. STERNE, supra note 105, at 255. 
117. J.D. Lasica, The Net NEVER Forgets, SALON, Nov. 25, 1998, at 
http://www.salon.com /21st/feature /1998/11/25feature.html. 
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digitized into the electric world of cyberspace. 
These developments certainly suggest a threat to privacy, but what 
specifically is the problem?  As the remainder of this Article will show, the 
way this question is answered has profound implications for the way the law 
will grapple with the problem in the future. 
III.  RETHINKING INFORMATION PRIVACY 
The most widely discussed metaphor in the discourse of information 
privacy118 is George Orwell’s depiction of Big Brother in Nineteen Eighty-
Four.  Courts and commentators have consistently turned to this metaphor 
when discussing a host of other privacy problems, and it has proven quite 
useful for understanding the threat to privacy caused by government searches 
and seizures and other law enforcement actions.119  It is no surprise, then, that 
the burgeoning discourse on information privacy has seized upon this 
metaphor. 
However, not all privacy problems are the same, and not all problems can 
be understood in their full depth and complexity with the same metaphor.  The 
problem of databases is relatively new.  Although it has slowly brewed during 
the twentieth century, the problem has only begun to boil in the past thirty to 
forty years.  Discussion of the problem by legal academics began only in the 
mid 1960s and early 1970s as the public and private sectors began to 
computerize their records.120 
In this Part, I explain why the Big Brother metaphor does not adequately 
conceptualize the database problem and propose an alternative metaphor 
(Kafka’s The Trial) to understand the problem more completely. 
A.   The Big Brother Metaphor 
George Orwell’s depiction of Big Brother in Nineteen Eighty-Four is so 
commonly known that a short description will suffice.  Big Brother is an all-
knowing, constantly vigilant government that regulates every aspect of one’s 
existence—even one’s private thoughts.  In every corner are posters of an 
enormous face, with “eyes [that] follow you about when you move” and the 
 
118. “Information privacy” is the term theorists use to discuss the privacy implications 
of the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.  Information privacy is often 
contrasted with “decisional privacy” which involves the extent to which the state can 
interfere with the decisions one makes with regard to one’s body and family.  Decisional 
privacy involves matters such as contraception, procreation, abortion, and child rearing. 
119. See notes 3-16 supra and accompanying text. 
120. See M ILLER, supra note 45; ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM  (1967); 
WESTIN & BAKER, supra note 2; Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls Over the 
Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342 
(1966). 
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caption “BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU.”121 
Big Brother demands complete obedience from its citizens and controls all 
aspects of their lives.  It constructs the language, rewrites the history, purges its 
critics, indoctrinates the population, burns books, and obliterates all 
disagreeable relics from the past.  Big Brother’s goal is uniformity and 
complete discipline, and it attempts to police people to an unrelenting degree—
even their innermost thoughts.  Any trace of individualism is quickly 
suffocated. 
This terrifying totalitar ian state achieves its control by targeting the private 
life, employing various techniques of power to eliminate any sense of privacy. 
Big Brother views solitude as dangerous.122  Its techniques of power are 
predominantly methods of surveillance. Big Brother  is constantly monitoring 
and spying; uniformed patrols linger on street corners; helicopters hover in the 
skies, poised to peer into windows.  The primary surveillance tool is a device 
called a “telescreen” which is installed into each house and apartment.  The 
telescreen is a bilateral television—individuals can watch it, but it also enables 
Big Brother to watch them: 
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at 
any given moment.  How often, or on what system, the Thought Police 
plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork.  It was even conceivable 
that they watched everybody all the time. . . . You had to live—did live, from 
habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was 
overheard, and, except in d arkness, every movement scrutinized.123 
Citizens have no way of discovering if and when they are being watched.  
This surveillance both real and threatened is combined with swift and terrifying 
force and violence: “People simply disappeared, always during the night.  Your 
name was removed from the registers, every record of everything you had ever 
done was wiped out, your one-time existence was denied and then 
forgotten.”124 
Orwell’s Big Brother narrative brilliantly captures the horror of the world 
it depicts, and its images continue to be invoked in the legal discourse of 
privacy and information.  “The ultimate horror in Orwell’s imagined anti-
utopia,” observes Dennis Wrong, “is that men are deprived of the very capacity 
for cherishing private thoughts and feelings opposed to the regime, let alone 
acting on them.”125 
The telescreen functions similarly to the Panopticon, an architectural 
design for a prison, originally conceived by Jeremy Bentham in 1791.126  In 
 
121. ORWELL, supra note 6, at 3. 
122. See id. at 70. 
123. Id. at 4. 
124. Id. at 20. 
125. DENNIS H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES AND USES 115 (1979). 
126. DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 62 
(1994). 
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Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault provides a compelling description of 
this artifice of power: 
[A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is 
pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the 
peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole 
width of the building . . . . All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a 
central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned 
man, a worker or a schoolboy.  By the effect of backlighting, one can observe 
from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive 
shadows in the cells of the periphery.  They are like so many cages, so many 
small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and 
constantly visible.127 
The Panopticon is a device of discipline; its goal is to ensure order, to 
prevent plots and riots, to mandate total obedience.  The Panopticon achieves 
its power through an ingenious technique of surveillance, one that is ruthlessly 
efficient.  By setting up a central observation tower from which all prisoners 
can be observed and by concealing from them any indication of whether they 
are being watched at any given time, “surveillance is permanent in its effects, 
even if it is discontinuous in its action.”128  Instead of having hundreds of 
patrols and watchpersons, only a few people need to be in the tower.  Those in 
the tower can watch any inmate but they cannot be seen.  By always being 
visible, by constantly living under the reality that one could be observed at any 
time, people assimilate the effects of surveillance into themselves.  They obey 
not because they are monitored but because of their fear that they could be 
watched.  This fear alone is sufficient to achieve control.  The Panopticon is so 
efficient that nobody needs to be in the tower at all. 
As Foucault observed, the Panopticon is not merely limited to the prison or 
to a specific architectural structure—it is a technology of power that can be 
used in many contexts and in a multitude of ways.129 In Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
the telescreen works in a similar way to the Panopticon, serving as a form of 
one-way surveillance that structures the behavior of those that are observed.  
The collection of information in cyberspace can be readily analogized to the 
telescreen.  As we surf the Internet, information about us is being collected; we 
are being watched, but we do not know when or to what extent. 
The metaphor of Big Brother understands privacy in terms of power, and it 
views privacy as an essential dimension of the political structure of society.  
The metaphor properly understands the problem of databases and privacy as 
concerning the very architecture of freedom and democracy—not merely 
individual reputations, feelings, and interests.  Big Brother attempts to 
dominate the private life because it is the key to controlling an individual’s 
 
127. M ICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books, 1st American ed. 1977). 
128. Id. at 201. 
129. Id. at 205. 
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entire existence: her thoughts, ideas, and actions. 
Big Brother currently dominates the entire discourse of information 
privacy.130  As one state supreme court justice observed: 
Our nation’s current social developments harbor insidious evolutionary forces 
which propel us toward a collective, Orwellian society. . . . Government 
agencies  . . . have acquired miles and acres of files, enclosing revelations of 
the personal affairs and conditions of millions of private individuals.  Credit 
agencies and other business enterprises assemble similar collections.131 
Paul Schwartz compares Internet “surveillance” to Orwell’s telescreen, 
concluding that cyber-surveillance is even more insidious.  While the 
telescreen lacked any capacity to store data, the “Internet creates digital 
surveillance with nearly limitless data storage possibilities and efficient search 
possibilities.”132  Further, instead of one Big Brother, today there are a 
“myriad” of “Big and Little Brothers” collecting personal data and 
“information technology has greatly encouraged the sharing of personal data 
between government and business.”133 
Even when not directly invoking the metaphor, commentators frequently 
speak in its language, evoke its images and symbols, and define privacy 
problems in similar conceptual terms.  Commentators view databases as having 
many of the same purposes (social control, suppression of individuality) and 
employing many of the same techniques (surveillance and monitoring) as Big 
Brother.  David Flaherty explains that the “storage of personal data can be used 
to limit opportunity and to encourage conformity.”134  He elaborates: “The 
existence of dossiers containing personal information collected over a long 
period of time can have a limiting effect on behavior; knowing that 
participation in an ordinary political activity may lead to surveillance can have 
a chilling effect on the conduct of a particular individual.”135 
In Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, Jerry Kang observes: 
[D]ata collection in cyberspace produces data that are detailed, computer-
processable, indexed to the individual, and permanent.  Combine this with the 
fact that cyberspace makes data collection and analysis exponentially cheaper 
than in real space, and we have what Roger Clarke has identified as the 
genuine threat of “dataveillance.”136 
“Dataveillance,” a term coined by Roger Clarke, refers to the “systematic 
use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or 
 
130. See notes 2-16 supra and accompanying text. 
131. White v. California, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (1971) 
(Friedman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
132. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1657 n.294. 
133. Id. 
134. DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 9 (1989). 
135. Id. 
136. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1193, 1261 (1998). 
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communications of one or more persons.”137  According to Colin Bennet, 
“[t]he term dataveillance has been coined to describe the surveillance practices 
that the massive collection and storage of vast quantities of personal data have 
facilitated.”138  Dataveillance is thus a new form of surveillance, a method of 
watching not through the eye or the camera, but by collecting facts and data. 
Drawing from Stanley Benn, Kang argues that surveillance is an attack on 
human dignity, interfering with free choice because observation “brings one to 
a new consciousness of oneself, as something seen through another’s eyes.”139  
Kang claims that “surveillance leads to self-censorship.”140  Likewise, Paul 
Schwartz claims that data collection “creates a potential for suppressing a 
capacity for free choice: the more that is known about an individual, the easier 
it is to force his obedience.”141  According to this view, the problem with 
databases is that they are a form of surveillance that curtails individual 
freedom. 
Despite the fact that the discourse appropriately conceptualizes privacy 
through metaphor and that the Big Brother metaphor has proven quite useful 
for a number of privacy problems, the metaphor has significant limitations for 
the database privacy problem.  The metaphor depicts a particular technique of 
power—surveillance.  Certainly, monitoring is an aspect of information 
collection, and databases may eventually be used in ways that resemble the 
disciplinary regime of Big Brother.  However, most of the existing practices 
associated with databases are quite different in character.  Direct marketers 
wish to observe behavior so they can tailor goods and advertisements to 
individual differences.  True, they desire consumers to act in a certain way (to 
purchase their product), but their limited attempts at control are far from the 
repressive regime of total control exercised by Big Brother.  The goal of much 
data collection by marketers aims not at suppressing individuality but at 
studying it and exploiting it. 
The most insidious aspect of the surveillance of Big Brother is missing in 
the context of databases: human judgment about the activities being observed 
(or the fear of that judgment).  Surveillance leads to conformity, inhibition, and 
self-censorship in situations where it is likely to involve human judgment.  
 
137. Roger Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, Nov. 1987 at 3, 
available at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/CACM88.html; see also  
Roger Clarke, Introduction to Dataveillance and Information Privacy, and Definitions of 
Terms, Sept. 16, 1999, available  at http://www.anu.edu.au/ 
people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Intro.html. 
138. Colin J. Bennet, The Public Surveillance of Personal Data: A Cross-National 
Analysis, in COMPUTERS, SURVEILLANCE, AND PRIVACY 237 (David Lyon & Elia Zureik eds., 
1996). 
139. Kang, supra note 136, at 1260 (quoting Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and 
Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 227 (Ferdinand David 
Schoeman ed., 1984). 
140. Id. at 1260. 
141. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation, supra note 11, at 560. 
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Being observed by an insect on the wall is not invasive for privacy; rather, 
privacy is threatened by being subject to human observation, which involves 
judgments that can affect one’s life and reputation.  Since marketers generally 
are interested in aggregate data, they do not care about snooping into particular 
people’s private lives.  Much personal information is amassed and processed by 
computers; we are being watched not by other humans, but by machines, which 
gather information, compute profiles, and generate lists for mailing, emailing, 
or calling.  This impersonality makes the surveillance less invasive. 
While having one’s actions monitored by computers does not involve 
immediate perception by a human consciousness, it still exposes people to the 
possibility of future review and disclosure.  In the context of databases, 
however, this possibility is remote.  Even when such data is used for marketing, 
marketers merely want to make a profit, not uproot a life or soil a reputation. 
I do not, however, mean to discount the dangerous effects of surveillance 
through the use of databases.  Although the purposes of the users of personal 
data are generally not malignant, databases can still result in unintended 
harmful social effects.  The mere knowledge that one’s behavior is being 
monitored and recorded certainly can lead to self-censorship and inhibition.  
Foucault’s analysis of surveillance points to a more subtle yet more pervasive 
effect:  surveillance changes the entire landscape in which people act, leading 
toward an internalization of social norms that soon is not even perceived as 
repressive.142  This view of the effects of surveillance raises important 
questions regarding the amount of normalization that is desirable in society.  
While our instincts may be to view all normalization as an insidious force, most 
theories of the good depend upon a significant degree of normalization to hold 
society together. 
Although the effects of surveillance are certainly a part of the database 
problem, the heavy focus on surveillance miscomprehends the most central and 
pernicious effects of databases.  Understanding the problem as surveillance 
fails to account for the majority of our activities in the world and web.  A large 
portion of our personal information involves facts that we are not embarrassed 
about: our financial information, race, marital status, hobbies, occupation, and 
the like.  Most people surf the web without wandering into its dark corners.  
The vast majority of the information collected about us concerns relatively 
innocuous details.  The surveillance model does not explain why the recording 
of this non-taboo information poses a problem.  The focus of the surveillance 
model is on the fringes— and often involves behaviors we may indeed want to 
inhibit such as cult activity, terrorism, and child pornography. 
As I will illustrate in the next section, there is a serious problem caused by 
databases which is overlooked by the Big Brother metaphor, one that poses a 
threat not just to the freedom to explore the taboo, but to freedom in general.  It 
is a problem that implicates the type of society we are becoming, the way we 
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think, our place in the larger social order, and our ability to exercise 
meaningful control over our lives. 
B.   An Alternative Metaphor: Kafka’s The Trial 
Ascribing metaphors is not only a descriptive endeavor but also an act of 
political theorizing with profound normative implications.  According to 
Richard Posner, however, “it is a mistake to try to mine works of literature for 
political or economic significance”143 because works of literature are better 
treated as aesthetic works rather than “as works of moral or political 
philosophy.”144  To the contrary, literature supplies the metaphors by which we 
conceptualize certain problems, and Posner fails to acknowledge the role that 
metaphor plays in shaping our collective understanding.  Metaphors function 
not to render a precise descriptive representation of the problem; rather, they 
capture our fears and concerns over privacy in a way that is palpable, potent, 
and compelling.  Metaphors are instructive not for their realism but for the way 
they direct our focus to certain social and political phenomena. 
Certainly, metaphors must have a certain fit to the experiences they 
structure, for metaphors are tools of understanding, and understanding is not an 
unfettered exercise but one involving interaction with what we experience.  
However, metaphors are never an exact fit; they are not identical to what they 
depict; and much philosophical discourse concerns which metaphors we use.  
As the understanding of experience is not a once-and-done activity but an 
ongoing process, we are in constant search for new metaphors to better 
comprehend our situation.  Although we cannot arbitrarily cast out old 
metaphors and adopt new ones, we certainly can exercise control over the 
metaphors we use. 
Franz Kafka’s harrowing depiction of bureaucracy in The Trial is the most 
appropriate metaphor to capture the problem with databases.  The Trial opens 
with the protagonist, Joseph K., awakening one morning to find a group of 
officials in his apartment, who inform him that he is under arrest.  K. is 
bewildered at why he has been placed under arrest: “I cannot recall the slightest  
 
143.  Richard A. Posner, Orwell Versus Huxley: Economics, Technology, Privacy, and 
Satire, 24 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 1-2 (2000), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=194572. 
144. Id. at 31. Specifically, Posner argues that Nineteen Eighty-Four as well as Brave 
New World do not provide much insight about privacy in the modern world. See id. at 2.  
Although Posner recognizes that the “telescreen is a powerful metaphor for the loss of 
privacy in a totalitarian state,” id. at 19, he argues that Huxley was more accurate in 
predicting today’s technology than Orwell.  See id. at 35.  However, despite its extreme 
portrait of a totalitarian society (so extreme that it at times resembles a caricature), the Big 
Brother metaphor has been indispensable to discussions about the Fourth Amendment and 
privacy in the law enforcement context.  The Big Brother metaphor is important to the 
discourse because one of the central questions concerning privacy is what type of society we 
want to construct, and the metaphor speaks directly to this question. 
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offense that might be charged against me.  But even that is of minor importance, 
the real question is, who accuses me?  What authority is conduc ting these 
proceedings?”145  When he asks why the officials have come to arrest him, an 
official replies:  “You are under arrest, certainly, more than that I do not 
know.”146  Instead of taking him away to a police station, the officials 
mysteriously leave. 
Throughout the rest of the novel, Joseph K. begins a frustrating quest to 
discover why he has been arrested and how his case will be resolved.  A vast 
bureaucratic court has apparently scrutinized his life and assembled a dossier 
on him.  The Court is clandestine and mysterious, and court records are 
“inaccessible to the accused.”147  In an effort to learn about this Court and the 
proceedings against him, Joseph K. scuttles throughout the city, encountering a 
maze of lawyers, priests, and others, each revealing small scraps of know ledge 
into the workings of the Court.  In a pivotal scene, Joseph K. meets a painter 
who gleaned much knowledge of the obscure workings of the Court while 
painting judicial portraits.  The painter explains to K.: 
“The whole dossier continues to circulate, as the regular official routine 
demands, passing on to the highest Courts, being referred to the lower ones 
again, and then swinging backwards and forwards with greater or smaller 
oscillations, longer or shorter delays . . . . No document is ever lost, the Court 
never forgets anything. One day—quite unexpectedly—some Judge will take 
up the documents and look at them attentively . . . .”  “And the case begins all 
over again?” asked K. almost incredulously.  “Certainly” said the painter.148 
Ironically, after the initial arrest, it is Joseph K. who takes the initiative in 
seeking out the Court.  He is informed of an interrogation on Sunday, but only if 
he has no objection to it:  “Nevertheless he was hurrying fast, so as if possible to 
arrive by nine o’clock, although he had not even been required to appear at any 
specific time.”149  Although the Court has barely imposed any authority, not even 
specifying when Joseph K. should arrive for his interrogation, he acts as if this 
Court operates with strict rules and makes every attempt to obey.  After the 
interrogation, the Court seems to forget all about K.  Joseph K., however, 
becomes obsessed with his case.  He wants to be recognized by the Court and to 
resolve his case; in fact, being ignored by the Court becomes a worse torment 
than being arrested. 
As K. continues his search, he becomes increasingly perplexed at this 
unusual Court.  The higher officials keep themselves hidden; the lawyers claim 
they have connections to Court officials but never offer any proof or results.  
Hardly anyone seems to have direct contact with the Court.  In addition, its 
“proceedings were not only kept secret from the general public, but from the 
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accused as well.”150  Yet K. continues to seek an acquittal from a crime he hasn’t 
been informed of and from an authority he cannot seem to find.  As Joseph K. 
scurries through the bureaucratic labyrinth of the law, he can never make any 
progress toward his acquittal:  “Progress had always been made, but the nature of 
the progress could never be divulged.  The Advocate was always working away 
at the first plea, but it had never reached a conclusion. . . .”151  In the end, Joseph 
K. is seized by two officials in the middle of the night and executed. 
Kafka’s The Trial best captures the scope, nature, and effects of the type of 
power relationship created by databases.  My point is not that The Trial 
presents a more realistic descriptive account of the database problem than Big 
Brother.  Like Nineteen Eighty-Four, The Trial presents a fictional portrait of a 
harrowing world, often exaggerating certain elements of society in a way that 
makes them humorous and absurd.  Certainly, most people are not told that 
they are inexplicably under arrest and they do not expect to be executed 
unexpectedly one evening.  The Trial is in part a satire, and what is important 
for the purposes of my argument are the insights the novel provides about 
society through its exaggerations.  In the context of computer databases, 
Kafka’s The Trial is the better focal point for the discourse than Big Brother.  
Kafka depicts an indifferent bureaucracy, where individuals are pawns, not 
knowing what is happening, having no say or ability to exercise meaningful 
control over the process.  This lack of control allows the trial to completely 
take over Joseph K.’s life.  The Trial captures the sense of helplessness, 
frustration, and vulnerability one experiences when a large bureaucratic 
organization has control over a vast dossier of details about one’s life.  At any 
time, something could happen to Joseph K.; decisions are made based on his 
data, and Joseph K. has no say, no knowledge, and no ability to fight back.  He 
is completely at the mercy of the bureaucratic process. 
As understood in light of the Kafka metaphor, the primary problem with 
databases stems from the way the bureaucratic process treats individuals and 
their information.  It is a problem that is at its heart about the nature of certain 
relationships in our society and their effects on individuals. 
Generally, the term bureaucracy refers to large public and private 
organizations with hierarchical structures and a set of elaborate rules, routines, 
and processes.152  For the purposes of this article, I will use the term to refer 
not to specific institutions but to a particular set of practices—specifically, how 
bureaucratic processes affect and influence individuals subjected to them.  
Bureaucratic processes are highly routinized, striving for increased efficiency, 
standardization of decisions, and the cultivation of specialization and expertise.  
 
150. Id. at 147-48. 
151. Id. at 157. 
152. See, e.g., M AX WEBER, FROM M AX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196 (H. H. 
Gerth & C. Wright Mills, trans. & eds., 1946) [hereinafter WEBER, FROM M AX WEBER]; see 
also M AX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 329-41 (A.M. 
Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947). 
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As Max Weber observes: “Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the 
files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and 
of material and personal costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the 
strictly bureaucratic administration. . . .”153 
Max Weber notes how bureaucracy can become “dehumanized” by striving 
to eliminate “love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional 
elements which escape calculation.”154  As I described elsewhere: 
Bureaucracy often cannot provide adequate attention to the individual—not 
because government officials are malicious but because they are busy, face 
extreme stress, must act within strict time constraints, have limited training, 
and are often not encouraged (or even authorized) to respond to idiosyncratic 
situations creatively.155  
The problem with databases emerges from subjecting personal information 
to the bureaucratic process with little intelligent control or limitation, resulting 
in a lack of meaningful participation in decisions about our information.156  
Bureaucratic decisionmaking processes are being exercised ever more 
frequently over a greater sphere of our lives, and we have little power or say 
within such a system, which tends to structure our participation along 
standardized ways that fail to enable us to achieve our goals, wants, and needs. 
The power effects of this relationship to bureaucracy are profound; 
however, its effects cannot adequately be explained by resorting to the 
understanding of power in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.  Orwell’s Big 
Brother employs a coercive power that is designed to dominate and oppress.  
Power, however, is not merely prohibitive; as illustrated by Aldous Huxley in 
Brave New World,157 it composes our very lives and culture.  Huxley describes 
a different form of totalitarian society—one controlled not by force and 
propaganda, but by entertainment and pleasure.  The population is addicted to a 
drug called Soma, which is administered by the government as a political tool 
to sedate the people.  Huxley presents a narrative about a society controlled not 
by a despotic coercive government like Big Brother, but by manipulation and 
consumption, where people participate in their own enslavement.  The 
government achieves obedience through social conditioning, propaganda, and 
other forms of indoctrination.158  It does not use the crude coercive techniques 
of violence and force, but instead employs a more subtle scientific method of 
control—through genetic engineering, psychology, and drugs. Power works 
internally—the government actively molds the private life of its citizens, 
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154. Id. at 216. 
155. Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill 
of Rights, 84 IOWA L. RE V. 941, 1017 (1999). 
156. I am certainly not suggesting that all problems with bureaucracy are privacy 
problems or vice versa. 
157. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). 
158. See generally id. at 20-32. 
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transforming it into a world of vapid pleasure, of mindlessness, and 
numbness.159 
Despite the differences, power for both Orwell and Huxley operates as an 
insidious force employed for a particular design.  The Trial depicts a different 
form of power.  The power employed in The Trial has no apparent goal; any 
purpose remains shrouded in mystery.  Nor is the power as direct and 
manipulative in design as that depicted by Orwell and Huxley.  The Court 
system barely even cares about Joseph K. at all.  The Trial depicts a world that 
differs significantly from our traditional notions of a totalitarian state.  Joseph 
K. was not arrested for his political views; nor did the Court manifest any plan 
to control people.  Indeed, Joseph K. was searching for some reason why he 
was arrested, a reason that he never discovered.  One frightening implication is 
that there was no reason, or if there were, it was absurd or arbitrary.  Joseph K. 
was subjected to a more purposeless process than a trial.  Indeed, the Court 
does not try to exercise much power over Joseph K.  His arrest does not even 
involve his being taken into custody—merely a notification that he is under 
arrest—and after an initial proceeding, the Court makes no further effort even 
to contact Joseph K.  
What is more discernible than any motive on the part of the Court or any 
overt exercise of power are the social effects of the power relationship between 
the bureaucracy and Joseph K.  The power depicted in The Trial is not so much 
a force as it is an element of relationships between individuals and society and 
government.  These relationships have balances of power.  What The Trial 
illustrates is that power is not merely exercised in totalitar ian forms, and that 
relationships to bureaucracies which are unbalanced in power can have 
debilitating effects upon individuals—regardless of the bureaucracies’ purposes 
(which may, in fact, turn out to be quite benign). 
Under this view, the problem with databases and the practices currently 
associated with them is that they disempower people.  They make people 
vulnerable by stripping them of control over their personal information.  There 
is no diabolical motive or secret plan for domination; rather, there is a web of 
thoughtless decisions made by low-level bureaucrats, standardized policies, 
rigid routines, and a way of relating to individuals and their information that 
often becomes indifferent to their welfare. 
C.  Forms of Dehumanization: Databases and the Kafka Metaphor 
Expounding on the Kafka metaphor, certain uses of databases foster a state 
of powerlessness and vulnerability created by people’s lack of any meaningful 
form of participation in the collection and use of their personal information.  
 
159. For Huxley’s own commentary on his novel, see ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW 
WORLD REVISITED (1958).  For an insightful comparison between Huxley and Orwell, see 
NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH vii (1986). 
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Bureaucracy and power is certainly not a new problem, and it has been quite 
artfully depicted in the work of Max Weber.  Databases do not cause the 
disempowering effects of bureaucracy; they exarcerbate it—not merely by 
magnifying of existing power imbalances but by transforming these 
relationships in profound ways that implicate our freedom.  The problem is 
thus old and new, and its additional dimensions within the Information Age 
require extensive explication. 
One of the great dangers of using information that we generally regard as 
private is that we often make judgments based on this private information about 
the person.  As Kenneth Karst warned in the 1960s, one danger of “a 
centralized, standardized data processing system” is that the facts stored about 
an individual “will become the only significant facts about the subject of the 
inquiry.”160  Jeffrey Rosen aptly observes, “Privacy protects us from being 
misdefined and judged out of context in a world of short attention spans, a 
world in which information can easily be confused with knowledge.  True 
knowledge of another person is the culm ination of a slow process of mutual 
revelation.”161 
Although the facts do not capture our personalities, they still have power 
over us, for important decisions are often made about our lives on the basis of 
this information.  The problem is that such records often fail to tell the entire 
story, yet an individual is frequently judged on the basis of this information and 
important facets about her life—whether she gets a loan, a job, or a license—
are decided based upon this information. 
Increased reliance upon such easily quantifiable and classifiable 
information is having profound social effects.  The nature and volume of 
information affects the way people analyze, use, and react to information.  
Currently, we rely quite heavily on quantifiable data: statistics, polls, numbers, 
and figures.  In the law alone, there is a trend to rank schools; to measure the 
influence of famous jurists by looking to citations to opinions;162 to measure 
the importance of law review articles by looking at citations to them;163 to rank 
law journals with an elaborate system of establishing point values for authors  
 
160. Karst, supra note 120, at 361.  For a very interesting account of the problems 
created by the use of personal information to categorize and sort individuals, see generally 
OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL 
INFORMATION  (1993). 
161. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 8 (2000). 
162. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 74-91 (1990) 
(measuring Benjamin Cardozo’s reputation by a Lexis search counting mentions of his 
name). 
163. See, e.g.,  Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revised, 71 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 751, 751 (1996) (listing the “one hundred most-cited legal articles of all 
time”).  For a humorous critique of this enterprise, see J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, 
How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV. 843 (1996). 
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of articles;164 and to rank the influence of academic movements by checking 
citations.165  The goal of this use of empirical data is to eliminate the ambiguity 
and noncommensurability of many aspects of life and try to categorize them 
into neat tidy categories.  The computer has exarcerbated this tendency, for the 
increase in information and the way computers operate furthers this type of 
categorization and lack of judgment. 166  Indeed, much of this tendency in legal 
scholarship is due to the advent of computer research databases, which can 
easily check for citations and specific terms. 
Certainly, quantifiable information can be accurate and serve as the best 
way for making particular decisions.  Even when quantifiable information is 
not exact, it is useful for making decisions because of administrative feasibility.  
Considering all the variables and a multitude of incommensurate factors might 
simply be impossible or too costly. 
Nevertheless, the information in databases often fails to capture the texture 
of our lives.  Rather than provide a nuanced portrait of our personalities, they 
capture the stereotypes and the brute facts of what we do without the reasons.  
For example, a record of an arrest without the story or reason is misleading.  
The arrest could have been for civil disobedience in the 1960s—but it is still 
recorded as an arrest with some vague label, such as disorderly conduct, 
slapped onto it.  It appears no differently from the arrest of a vandal.  In short, 
we are reconstituted in databases as a digital persona composed of data.  The 
privacy problem stems paradoxically from the pervasiveness of this data—the 
fact that it encompasses much of our lives—as well as from its limitations—
how it fails to capture us, how it distorts who we are. 
Privacy concerns an individual’s power in the elaborate web of social 
relationships that encompasses her life.  Today, a significant number of these 
relationships involve interaction with public and private institutions.  In 
addition to the myriad of public agencies that regulate the products we 
purchase, the environment, and the like, we depend upon private institutions 
such as telephone companies, utility companies, Internet service providers, 
cable service providers, and health insurance companies.  We also depend upon 
companies that provide products that we view as essential to our daily lives: 
hygiene, transportation, entertainment, news, and so on.  Our lives are 
 
164. See, e.g.,  Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis G. Coleman, Ranking Law Reviews: An 
Empirical Analysis Based on Author Prominence, 39 ARIZ. L. RE V. 15 (1997). 
165. See, e.g.,  Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 
108 YALE L.J. 1059, 1061 n.9 (1999) (comparing Westlaw search of law reviews for terms 
“law and economics” and “law and literature” to measure comparative influence of each of 
these academic movements). 
166. Oscar Gandy contends that the use of profiling to form predictive models of 
human behavior incorrectly assumes that “the identity of the individual can be reduced, 
captured, or represented by measurable characteristics.” Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Exploring 
Identity and Identification in Cyberspace, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 
1100 (2000).  The use of profiles is “inherently conservative” because such profiles 
“reinforce assessments and decisions made in the past.”  Id. at 1101. 
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ensconced in these institutions, which have power over our day-to-day 
activities (through what we consume, read, and watch), our culture, politics, 
education, and economic well-being.  We are engaged in relationships with 
these institutions, even if on the surface our interactions with them are as 
rudimentary and distant as signing up for services, paying bills, and requesting 
repairs.  With many firms—such as credit reporting agencies—we do not even 
take affirmative steps to establish a relationship. 
Privacy involves the ability to avoid the powerlessness of having others 
control information that can affect whether an individual gets a job, becomes 
licensed to practice in a profession, or obtains a critical loan.  It involves the 
ability to avoid the collection and circulation of such powerful information in 
one’s life without having any say in the process, without knowing who has 
what information, what purposes or motives those entities have, or what will be 
done with that information in the future.  Privacy involves the power to refuse 
to be treated with bureaucratic indifference when one complains about errors or 
when one wants certain data expunged.  It is not merely the collection of data 
that is the problem—it is our complete lack of control over the ways it is used 
or may be used in the future. 
Personal information can be put to extremely troubling uses.  In Paul v. 
Davis,167 the police distributed flyers with names and photographs to various 
stores erroneously listing the plaintiff as an active shoplifter.  The plaintiff 
almost lost his job and was embarrassed and afraid to enter stores. In another 
example, an Internet site known as the “Nuremberg Files” posted information 
about doctors working in abortion clinics, including names, photos, Social 
Security numbers, home addresses, descriptions of their cars, and information 
about their families.168  Doctors who were killed had a black line drawn 
through their names.  Names of wounded doctors were shaded in gray.  The 
doctors sued.  At trial, they testified as to how their lives became riddled with 
fear, how some wore bulletproof vests and wigs in public.  They won the suit 
and the site was shut down, but the appellate court reversed on First 
Amendment grounds.169  The availability of personal data and the ease with 
which it can be traded, disclosed, and used can have devastating effects on the 
lives of individuals.  The problem is not that such records are regularly 
disclosed, but that there is often such little care involved in protecting them and 
that people have no control over them. 
This powerlessness is compounded by the fact that the process of 
information collection in America is clandestine, duplicitous, and unfair.  The 
choices given to people over their information are hardly choices at all.  People 
must relinquish personal data to gain employment, procure insurance, obtain a  
 
167. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
168. SYKES, supra note 47, at 42-44. 
169. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).  
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credit card, or otherwise participate like a normal citizen in today’s economy.  
Consent is virtually meaningless in many contexts.  When people give consent, 
they must often consent to a total surrender of control over their information.170 
Collection of information is often done by misleading the consumer.  
General Electric sent a supposedly anonymous survey to shareholders asking 
them to rate various aspects of the company.  Unbeknownst to those surveyed, 
the survey’s return envelope was coded so that the responses could be matched 
to names in the company’s shareholder database.171 
Some information is directly solicited via registration questionnaires or 
other means such as competitions and sweepstakes.  The warranty registration 
cards of many products—which ask a host of lifestyle questions—are often 
sent not to the company that makes the product but to National Demographics 
and Lifestyles Company at a Denver post office box.  This company has 
compiled information on over 20 million people and markets it to other 
companies.172  Often, there is an implicit misleading notion that consumers 
must fill out a registration questionnaire in order to be covered by the warranty. 
Frequent shopper programs and discount cards —which involve filling out 
a questionnaire and then carrying a special card that provides discounts—
enable the scanner data to be matched to data about individual consumers.173  
This technique involves offering savings in return for personal information and 
the ability to track a person’s grocery purchases.174  However, there are scant 
disclosures that such an exchange is taking place, and there are virtually no 
limits on the use of the data. 
Conde Nast Publications Inc. (which publishes the New Yorker, Vanity 
Fair, Vogue, and other magazines) recently sent out a booklet of 700 questions 
concerning detailed information about an individual’s hobbies, health 
(including drugs used, acne problems, vaginal/yeast infections, etc.), shopping 
preferences, etc.  Almost 400,000 people responded.  In return for the data, the 
survey said:  “Just answer the questions below to start the conversation and 
become part of this select group of subscribers to whom marketers listen first.”  
Conde Nast maintains a database of information on 15 million people.  Stephen 
Jacoby, the vice president for marketing and databases said:  “What we’re 
trying to do is enhance the relationship between the subscriber and their 
 
170. For example, insurance release forms typically give insurance companies 
significant control over an individual’s medical records. See BRANSCOMB, supra note 81, at 
67. 
171. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Survey Says: You’re Not Anonymous, WASH. POST, June 9, 
1999, at E1. 
172. See, e.g., GIVENS, supra note 48, at 23; HUGHES, supra note 61, at 318 (“For many 
years, National Demographic and Lifestyles. . .has been compiling customer information 
from registration cards packed into more than 100 different consumer products.”). 
173. See LARSON, supra note 36, at 134-35. 
174. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Bargains at a Price: Shoppers’ Privacy; Cards Let 
Supermarkets Collect Data, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at A1. 
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magazine.  In a sense, it’s a benefit to the subscriber.”175 
There is no “conversation” created by supplying the data.  Conde Nast 
does not indicate how the information will be used.  It basically tries to entice 
people to give information for a vague promise of little or no value.  While the 
company insists that it will not share information with “outsiders,” it does not 
explain who constitutes an “outsider.”  The information remains in the control 
of the company, with no limitations on use. Merely informing the consumer 
that data may be sold to others is an inadequate form of disclosure.  The 
consumer does not know how many times the data will be resold, to whom it 
will be sold, or what purposes it will be used for. 
This lack of control is exacerbated by the often thoughtless and 
irresponsible ways that bureaucracies use personal information and their lack of 
accountability in using and protecting the data.  In other words, the problem is 
not simply a lack of individual control over information, but “control out of 
control”—a situation where nobody is exercising meaningful control over the 
information. 
In bureaucratic settings, privacy policy tends to fall into drift and be 
reactionary.  In a detailed study of organizations such as banks, health and life 
insurance companies, and credit agencies, H. Jeff Smith concluded that all of 
the organizations “exhibited a remarkably similar approach: the policy-making 
process, which occurred over time, was a wandering and reactive one.”176  
According to a senior executive at a health insurance company, “We’ve been 
lazy on the privacy [issues] for several years now, because we haven’t had 
anybody beating us over the head about them.”177  According to Smith, most 
executives in the survey were followers rather than leaders: “[M]ost executives 
wait until an external threat forces them to consider their privacy policies.”178  
Furthermore, there have been several highly publicized instances where 
companies violated their own privacy policies.179 
More insidious than drifting and reactionary privacy policies are 
irresponsible and careless uses of personal information.  For example, 
Metromail Corporation, a seller of direct marketing information, hired inmates  
 
175. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Survey Asks Readers to Get Personal, and 400,000 Do, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1998, at C18. 
176. H. JEFF SMITH, M ANAGING PRIVACY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE 
AMERICA 55 (1994). 
177. Id. at 67. 
178. Id. at 93. 
179. In 1998, the FTC charged GeoCities with lying to its subscribers about their 
privacy; the site had collected and sold information about children who played games on the 
site. SYKES, supra note 47, at 72. In 1999, a software program called RealJukebox created by 
RealNetworks, Inc., which enabled users to download digitial music, was secretly collecting 
personal information about its users and transmitting it to Real Networks in direct violation 
of their privacy policy that consumers would be informed about all information collected 
about them.  Shannon P. Duffy, Suit Says RealNetworks’ ‘RealJukeBox’ Software is Right 
Out of RealBigBrother , at http://biz.yahoo.com/law/991110/55122-7.html (Nov. 10, 1999). 
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to enter the information into databases.  This came to light when an inmate 
began sending harassing letters that were sexually explicit and filled with 
intimate details of people’s lives.180  A television reporter once paid $277 to 
obtain from Metromail a list of over 5000 children living in Pasadena, 
California.  The reporter gave as the name of the buyer the name of a well-
known child molester and murderer.181  These cases illustrate the complete 
lack of care and accountability by the corporations collecting the data. 
McVeigh v. Cohen182 best illustrates this problem.  A highly decorated 
seventeen-year veteran of the Navy sought to enjoin the Navy from discharging 
him under the statutory policy known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t 
Pursue.”183  When responding to a toy-drive for the crew of his ship, McVeigh 
accidentally used the wrong email account, sending a message under the alias 
“boysrch.” He signed the email “Tim” but included no other information.  The 
person conducting the toy-drive searched through the member profile directory 
of America Online (“AOL”) where she learned that “boysrch” was an AOL 
subscriber named Tim who lived in Hawaii and worked in the military. Under 
marital status, he had identified himself as “gay.”  The information was 
forwarded to the captain of the ship.  The ship’s legal adviser began to 
investigate, suspecting that “Tim” was the plaintiff McVeigh.  Before speaking 
to the plaintiff and without a warrant, the legal adviser had a paralegal contact 
AOL for more information.  The paralegal called AOL’s toll-free customer 
service number and, without identifying himself as a Navy serviceman, lied 
that he had received a fax sheet from an AOL customer and wanted to confirm 
who it belonged to.  The AOL representative told him that the customer was 
the plaintiff.  Despite a policy of not giving out personal information, AOL 
carelessly disclosed the data.184 
In sum, the privacy problem created by the use of databases stems from an 
often careless and unconcerned bureaucratic process—one that has little 
judgment or accountability—and is driven by ends other than the protection of 
people’s dignity.  We are not heading toward a world of Big Brother or one 
composed of Little Brothers, but toward a more mindless process—of 
bureaucratic indifference, arbitrary errors, and dehumanization—a world that is 
beginning to resemble Kafka’s vision in The Trial. 
Viewing the database problem in terms of the Kafka metaphor as opposed 
to the Big Brother metaphor has important ramifications for the way we apply  
 
180. WHITAKER, supra note 16, at 132-33; Nina Bernstein, Lives on File: The Erosion 
of Privacy—A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1997, at A1. 
181. GIVENS, supra note 48, at 176. 
182. 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998). 
183. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000). 
184. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A)-(B), (c)(1)(B) (2000), a remote computing 
service such as AOL may only disclose email contents or customer records to a 
governmental entity if the governmental entity first obtains either a warrant or the consent of 
the customer. 
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legal concepts and craft policies.  For example, Amazon.com—one of the 
largest retailers of books on the Internet—collects information about a 
customer’s taste in books (based on its sales to the user) and then provides 
book recommendations tailored to the customer.  If the problem is surveillance, 
then the most obvious solution would be to provide strict limits on 
Amazon.com’s collection of information.  This solution, however, would 
curtail much information collection that is necessary for business in today’s 
society and that is put to beneficial uses.  Indeed, many Amazon.com 
customers, myself included, find Amazon.com’s book recommendation service 
to be very helpful.  In contrast, if the problem is understood as I have depicted 
it, then the problem is not that Amazon is spying on its users or that it can use 
personal data to induce its customers to buy more books.  What is troubling is 
the unfettered ability of Amazon.com to do whatever it wants with this 
information.  Indeed, recently, this problem was illustrated when Amazon.com 
abruptly changed its privacy policy to allow the transfer of personal 
information to third parties in the event Amazon.com sold any of its assets or 
went bankrupt.185 
IV.   REGULATING INFORMATION 
Understanding the problem with the Kafka metaphor is not merely a 
descriptive endeavor, but has profound implications for the law of information 
privacy as well as which legal approaches are taken to solve the problem.  In 
this Part, I explore these implications. 
A.   The Limits of Privacy Law 
Throughout this century, a distinctive domain of law relating to privacy has 
begun to develop.186  Privacy law consists of a mosaic of various types of law: 
tort law, constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, evidentiary 
privileges, property law, and contract law.  Privacy law is best described with 
the notion of the bricoleur—a person who uses whatever is at hand as a tool to 
solve problems.187  Privacy law consists of legal tools at hand that are used by 
courts and policymakers to deal with the emerging problems created by the 
information revolution.  Much of privacy law is interrelated, and as Ken 
 
185. See Amazon Draws Fire For DVD-Pricing Test, Privacy-Policy Change, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 14, 2000 at B4.  Indeed, dot -com bankruptcies create a breakdown in the 
relationship between companies and consumers, resulting in little incentive for the bankrupt 
company to take measures to protect consumer data.  Personal information databases are 
often a company’s most valuable asset and could be sold to third-parties at bankruptcy to 
pay off creditors.  See Susan Stellin, Dot-Com Liquidations Put Consumer Data in Limbo, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at C4. 
186. See RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1-3 (1999). 
187. The notion of the bricoleur was used most famously by Claude Levi-Strauss, and 
is deftly explained in BALKIN, supra note 25, at 31. 
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Gormley observes, “various offshoots of privacy are deeply intertwined at the 
roots, owing their origins to the same soil.”188 
Although it is a relatively youthful body of law, privacy law emerged 
under an older paradigm for understanding privacy, one that was shaped by a 
different sort of privacy problem.  Privacy law was developed largely to 
address privacy problems of disclosure and surveillance, and consequently was 
aimed at protecting secrets and concealed information.  It was out of this 
paradigm that the Big Brother metaphor emerged.  Under the paradigm, 
privacy is about concealment, and it is invaded by watching and by public 
disclosure of confidential information. Surveillance is one of the ways by 
which one’s secrecy is invaded.  Although surveillance does not always invade 
one’s secrecy, the potential for such invasions is always present.  In short, this 
paradigm understands privacy problems as invasions into one’s hidden world. 
With its extensive focus on surveillance, the Big Brother metaphor merely 
reinforces this old paradigm.  My point is not that privacy law developed in the 
way it did because of the Big Brother metaphor.  Rather, privacy law 
developed with a host of problems other than databases in mind.  These 
problems are aptly captured by the Big Brother metaphor, but databases are 
not.  In other words, the Big Brother metaphor reinforces this older paradigm in 
privacy law, and to some extent inhibits privacy law from breaking away from 
its excessive focus on secrecy, surveillance, and disclosure. 
The highly influential 1890 article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, 
The Right to Privacy,189 is considered by many as one of the primary 
foundations of privacy law in the United States.  The article raised alarm at the 
intersection of “yellow journalism,”190 with its increasing hunger for 
sensational human interest stories, and the development of “instantaneous 
photograph[y.]”191  The focus of the article was on the press’s ability to invade 
the “sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”192  The article argued that 
existing legal causes of action currently did not adequately protect privacy but 
 
188. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1357 (1992). 
189. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. RE V. 
193 (1890). 
190. William L. Prosser, Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN 
ANTHOLOGY 104, 104 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) (noting rising popular dismay 
over “yellow journalism” at the time of Brandeis’ and Warren’s article). 
191. The term “instantaneous photography” was used by Warren and Brandeis to 
describe the development of cameras that were smaller, cheaper, and more easy to use.  The 
motivation of the authors in writing the article is widely disputed.  The prevailing view that 
the article was inspired by the reporting of Warren’s daughter’s wedding originated with 
Prosser in his famous 1960 privacy article.  See Prosser, supra note 190, at 104.  Critics have 
pointed out that in 1890, Warren’s oldest daughter was not even ten years old.  See 
TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 186, at 46.  In his superb historical account of privacy in 
America, Robert Ellis Smith explains that Warren was upset at a number of articles in 
Boston’s Saturday Evening Gazette reporting on the dinner parties thrown by his wife at 
their home.  See SMITH, supra note 30, at 118-19. 
192. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 189, at 195. 
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that legal concepts in the common law could be modified and combined to 
develop the proper protection of privacy. 
As early as 1903, courts and legislatures responded to the Warren and 
Brandeis article by creating a number of privacy torts to redress the harms that 
Warren and Brandeis had noted.193  By 1960, Dean William Prosser reported 
over 300 privacy cases in the seventy years since the Warren and Brandeis 
article had inspired the birth the privacy torts.194  He concluded that the cases 
could be classified as protecting four distinct interests, which have become 
widely used and have formed the basis for the privacy torts of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.195  These torts are commonly known collectively as 
“invasion of privacy” and specifically as (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) 
public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light or “publicity”; and (4) 
appropriation.196  Today, whether by statute or common law, most states 
recognize some or all of the privacy torts.197 
The tort of intrusion protects against the intentional intrusion into one’s 
“solitude or seclusion” or “his private affairs or concerns” that “would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”198 Although this tort could be applied 
to the information collection techniques of databases, most of the information 
collection is not “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”  Each particular 
instance of collection is often small and innocuous; the danger is created by the 
aggregation of information, a state of affairs typically created by hundreds of 
actors over a long period of time.  Indeed, courts have thrown out cases for 
intrusion involving the type of information that would likely be collected in 
databases.  For example, courts have rejected intrusion for obtaining a person’s 
unlisted phone number,199 for selling subscription lists to direct mail 
companies,200 and for collecting and disclosing an individual’s past insurance 
history.201  Further, intrusion must involve an invasion of “seclusion” and 
courts have thrown out intrusion suits when plaintiffs have been in public  
 
193. See, e.g., Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren 
and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (1990); Louis Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A 
Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 694 (1972).  Harry Kalven has even 
hailed it as the “most influential law review article of all.” Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort 
Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966). 
194. Prosser, supra note 190, at 107. 
195. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652C, 652D, 652E (1976) 
(discussing intrusion, misappropriation, publicity of private facts, and false light). 
196. Prosser, supra note 190, at 107. 
197. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 
1998)(recognizing a common law tort action for invasion of privacy and noting that 
Minnesota had remained one of the few hold-outs). 
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976). 
199. Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
200. Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
201. Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1978). 
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places.202  With regard to databases, much information collection and use 
occurs in public, and indeed, many parts of cyberspace may well be considered 
public places. 
The tort of private facts (or invasion of privacy) creates a cause of action 
when one makes public “a matter concerning the private life of another” in a 
way that “(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not 
of legitimate concern to the public.”203  Although this tort could conceivably be 
applied to certain uses of databases, such as the sale of personal information by 
the database industry, the tort of private facts appears designed to redress 
excesses of the press, and is accordingly focused on the widespread 
dissemination of personal information in ways that become known to the 
plaintiff.  In contrast, the disclosure of personal information through the use 
and sale of databases is often small and done in secret.  The trade in 
information is done behind closed doors in a kind of underworld that most 
people know little about.  It would be difficult for a plaintiff even to discover 
that such sales or disclosures have been made.  Even if marketers disclosed 
information widely to the public, the tort is limited to “highly offensive” facts, 
and most facts in databases would not be highly offensive if made public. 
Moreover, some marketing data may be deemed public record, or a plaintiff, by 
furnishing data in the first place, may be deemed to have assented to its public 
dissemination.204 
The tort of false light is primarily a variation on the defamation torts of 
libel and slander, protecting against the giving of “publicity to a matter 
concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light” that 
is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”205  Like defamation, this tort has 
limited applicability to the types of privacy harms created by the collection and 
use of personal information by way of computer databases.  Both defamation 
and false light protect one’s reputation, but the type of information collected in 
databases often is not harmful to one’s reputation. 
The tort of appropriation occurs when “[o]ne who appropriates to his own 
use or benefit the name or likeness of another. . . .”206  This tort is akin to a 
form of intellectual property right in aspects of one’s personhood.  The interest 
 
202. See Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 482-83 (D. Me. 1987) 
(noting that Maine recognizes no invasion of privacy action when photographers harassed 
and insulted plaintiff in a public place), vacated in part on other grounds, 845 F.2d 347 (1st 
Cir. 1988). 
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976). 
204. “[T]here is no liability for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiff’s life that 
are matters of public record, such as the date of his birth, the fact of his marriage, his 
military record, the fact that he is admitted to the practice of medicine or is licensed to drive 
a taxicab . . . . Similarly, there is no liability for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff 
himself leaves open to the public eye.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b 
(1976). 
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976). 
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1976). 
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protected is the individual’s right to “the exclusive use of his own identity, in 
so far as it is represented by his name or likeness.”207  This tort could be 
applied to the use of targeted marketing, which can be viewed as the use of 
personal information for profit.  However, the tort’s focus on protecting the 
commercial value of personal information has often prevented it from being an 
effective tool in grappling with the database privacy problem.  In Dwyer v. 
American Express Co.,208 a court held there was no appropriation when 
American Express sold its cardholders’ names to merchants because “an 
individual name has value only when it is associated with one of defendants’ 
lists.  Defendants create value by categorizing and aggregating these names.  
Furthermore, defendants’ practices do not deprive any of the cardholders of any 
value their individual names may possess.”209  In Shibley v. Time, Inc.,210 a 
court held that there was no action for appropriation when magazines sold 
subscription lists to direct mail companies because the plaintiff was not being 
used to endorse any product.  The appropriation tort aims at protecting one’s 
economic interest in a form of property, and is most effective at protecting 
celebrities who have created value in their personalities.211  This is not the 
same interest involved with privacy, which can be implicated regardless of the 
economic value accorded to one’s name or likeness. 
Even if it were possible to eliminate the above difficulties with some minor 
adjustments to the privacy torts, the privacy problem with databases transcends 
the specific injuries and harms that the privacy torts are designed to redress. By 
its nature, tort law looks to isolated acts, to particular infringements and 
wrongs.  The problem with databases does not stem from any specific act, but 
is a systemic issue of power caused by the aggregation of relatively small 
actions, each of which when viewed in isolation would appear quite innocuous.  
I refer to this as the “aggregation problem”—the fact that the whole is greater 
than the parts.  In other words, the problem emerges when individual 
information transactions, combinations, lapses in security, disclosures, or 
abusive uses are viewed collectively.  The problem is compounded by the fact 
that much of this activity occurs in secret outside the knowledge of the 
individual whose personal information is involved.  Therefore, proposed 
solutions involving the retooling of tort law—such as Jessica Litman’s proposal 
 
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1976). 
208. 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
209. Id. at 1356. 
210. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
211. According to the Restatement, the tort is “not limited to commercial 
appropriation.  It applies also when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and 
even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1976).  However, some states have limited liability under 
appropriation to commercial uses.  See id.  Further, the interest protected is not the 
protection of one’s “personal feelings against mental distress” but a “property right.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1976). 
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for a breach of trust tort remedy for companies that misuse information—will 
be severely limited in redressing the problem.212 
Attempts to use the Constitution to protect information privacy have 
similarly failed for misconstruing the problem.  At the outset, the Constitution 
only protects against state action, and many databases belong to the private 
sector.  However, since the government is often a supplier of information to the 
private sector and is a major source of databases, constitutional protection 
could serve as a good potential tool for grappling with the problem.  Although 
the Constitution does not explicitly provide for a right to privacy, a number of 
its provisions protect certain dimensions of privacy, and the Supreme Court has 
sculpted a right to privacy by molding together a variety of constitutional 
protections. 
The Fourth Amendment protects only against government infringements, 
and does nothing to control the collection and use of information by private 
bureaucracies.  To the limited extent to which the Fourth Amendment can be 
applied to databases, the Court has adhered rigidly to the notion of privacy as 
secrecy.  In Smith v. Maryland,213 the Court held that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers one dials.  The Court reasoned 
that such phone numbers were not secret because they were turned over to third 
parties (phone companies).214  Similarly, in United States v. Miller, the Court 
held that financial records possessed by third parties are not private under the 
Fourth Amendment.215  The Court’s focus —which stems from the paradigm 
that privacy is about protecting one’s hidden world—leads it to the view that 
when a third party has access to one’s personal information, there can be no 
privacy expectation in that information. 
In the landmark 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut, 216 the Court declared 
that an individual has a constitutional right to privacy.  The Court located this 
right within the “penumbras” or “zones” of freedom created by an expansive 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights.217  During the remainder of the twentieth 
century, the Court handed down an inconsistent line of cases, protecting certain 
fundamental life choices, such as abortion but not the right to die, and 
protecting certain aspects of one’s intim ate sexual life, such as contraception 
but not homosexual conduct.218 
 
212. See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy / Information Property, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1283, 1304-13 (2000) (recounting several egregious examples of companies’ breach of 
trust and noting the inadequacy of current tort law in those cases). 
213. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
214. Id. at 743. 
215. 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976). 
216. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
217. Id. at 484 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them 
life and substance. . . .  Various guarantees create zones of privacy.”). 
218. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the right to 
privacy does not extend to homosexual sexual conduct); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 
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In the 1977 decision, Whalen v. Roe,219 the Court extended its substantive 
due process privacy protection to information privacy.  New York passed a law 
requiring that records be kept of people who obtained prescriptions for certain 
addictive medications.220  Plaintiffs argued that the statute infringed upon their 
right to privacy.221  The Court held that the constitutionally protected “zone of 
privacy” extends to two distinct types of interests: (1) “independence in making 
certain kinds of important decisions”; and (2) the “individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”222  The former interest referred to the 
substantive due process fundamental life decisions line of cases beginning with 
Griswold.  The latter interest, however, was one that the Court had previously 
not defined. 
The plaintiffs argued that they feared the greater accessibility of their 
personal information and the potential for its disclosure.  As a result of this 
fear, they argued, many patients did not get the prescriptions they needed and 
this interfered with their independence in making decisions with regard to their 
health.  The Court, however, held that the constitutional right to information 
privacy required only a duty to avoid unreasonable disclosure, and that the state 
had taken adequate security measures.223 
The plaintiffs’ argument, however, was not that disclosure was the real 
privacy problem.  Rather, the plaintiffs were concerned that the collection of 
and greater access to their information made them lose control over their 
information.  A part of themselves—a very important part of their lives—was 
placed in the distant hands of the state and completely outside their control.  
This is similar to the notion of a chilling effect on free speech.  The effect is not 
caused by the actual enforcement of the law but by the fear that the existence of 
the law creates.  The Court acknowledged that the court record supported the 
plaintiffs’ contention that some people were so distraught over the law that they 
were not getting the drugs they needed.  However, the Court rejected this 
argument by noting that because over 100,000 prescriptions had been filled 
before the law had been enjoined, the public was not denied access to the 
drugs.224  The problem with the Court’s response is that the Court failed to 
indicate how many prescriptions had been filled before the law had been 
passed.  Without this, there is no way to measure the extent of the deterrence.  
 
(1973) (holding that the right to privacy extends to decision to have an abortion); Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (stating that the right to privacy extends to sexual 
relationships between unmarried heterosexuals); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (holding that the 
right to privacy extends to use of contraception among married couples. 
219. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
220. Such medications included opium, cocaine, methadone, and amphetamines which 
were used in treating epilepsy, narcolepsy, migraine headaches, and certain psychological 
disorders.  See id. at 593 n.8. 
221. Id. at 600. 
222. Id. at 599-600. 
223. Id. at 601-02. 
224. Id. at 603. 
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And even if there were only a few who were deterred, the anxiety caused by 
living under such a regime must also be taken into account. 
After Whalen, the Court affirmed this notion of constitutional protection 
for information privacy in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,225 
concluding that President Nixon had a constitutional privacy interest in records 
of his private communications with his family but not in records involving his 
official duties.  From then on, however, the Court did little to develop the right 
of information privacy.  As one court observed, the right “has been infrequently 
examined; as a result its contours remain less than clear.”226 
The constitutional right to information privacy is constrained by the 
paradigm of privacy as protecting one’s hidden world, and hence has not 
worked well to address the database privacy problem.  At most, a constitutional 
right to information privacy can limit the government’s disclosure of 
information, but the fact that most government records are public precludes 
liability.227  Lower courts have only found a constitutionally protected right to 
information privacy for records that are confidential.  Thus, while medical 
records are generally protected under constitutional information privacy,228 arrest 
and conviction records are not because this information is a matter of public 
record.229 
 
225. 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (holding that although ex-president Nixon had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in private communications with his family, doctor, and minister, it 
was outweighed by the public interest in Nixon’s papers). 
226. Davis v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1988). 
227. In an interesting contrast, the Court in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case 
recognized a different and more appropriate conception of privacy.  In United States v. 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), the Court held that FBI 
“rap sheets” compiling criminal history information about millions of people (much of 
which had been previously disclosed) were protected under FOIA’s privacy exemption 
because there is a difference “between scattered disclosure of bits of information contained 
in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole.”  Id. at 763-64.  This case will be 
discussed in more depth below.  Infra text accompanying notes 344-348. 
228. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir. 
1980) (holding that government agency’s request for medical records to investigate work-
related health hazards justified a minimal intrusion into the privacy of employees’ medical 
records, so long as the agency notified workers and allowed them a chance to contest the 
disclosure); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding a 
violation of a constitutional right to privacy where police disclosed that a person had AIDS); 
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (stating that prisoner has a 
constitutional right to privacy in his medical records); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 
667 F. Supp. 1269, 1282 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (holding that hospital’s allowing chaplains access 
to medical records violated constitutional privacy). 
229. Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that community 
notification laws for sex offenders (known as Megan’s Law) do not violate constitutional 
privacy because government’s interest in preventing sex offenses is compelling); Russell v. 
Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that Washington state’s version of 
Megan’s law does not violate constitutional privacy because the “information collected and 
disseminated by the Washington statute is already fully available to the public and is not 
constitutionally protected”); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
there is no constitutional privacy right in criminal records because “arrest and conviction 
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The famous case of Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority (SEPTA)230 best illustrates how the constitutional right to 
information privacy cannot comprehend the privacy problem of databases.  
There, the plaintiff Doe was HIV positive and told two doctors (Dr. Press and 
Dr. Van de Beek) at his work of his condition but nobody else.  He strove to 
keep it a secret.  His employer, SEPTA, a self-insured employer, maintained a 
prescription drug program with Rite-Aid as the drug supplier.  SEPTA 
monitored the costs of its program.  Doe was taking a drug used exclusively in 
the treatment of HIV, and he asked Dr. Press whether the SEPTA officials who 
reviewed the records would see the names for the various prescriptions.  Dr. 
Press said no, and Doe had his prescription filled under the plan.  
Unfortunately, even though SEPTA never asked for the names, Rite-Aid 
supplied the names corresponding to prescriptions when it sent SEPTA the 
reports.  Pierce, the SEPTA official reviewing the records, became interested in 
Doe’s use of the drug and began to investigate.  She asked Dr. Van de Beek 
about the drug, and he told her what the drug was used for but would not 
answer any questions about the person using the drugs.  Pierce also asked 
questions of Dr. Press, who informed Doe of Pierce’s inquiry.231 
This devastated Doe.  Doe began to fear that other people at work had 
found out.  He began to perceive that people were treating him differently. 
However, he was not fired, and in fact, he was given a promotion.  The court 
held that the constitutional right to information privacy had not been violated 
because there had not been any disclosure of confidential information.232  
Pierce had merely informed doctors who knew already.  Doe offered no proof 
that anybody else knew, and accordingly, the court weighed his privacy 
invasion as minimal. 
This, however, missed the nature of Doe’s complaint.  Regardless of 
whether he was imagining how his co-workers were treating him, he was 
indeed suffering a real palpable fear.  His real injury was the powerlessness of 
having no idea who else knew he had HIV, what his employer thought of him, 
or how the information could be used against him.  This feeling of unease 
changed the way he perceived everything at his place of employment.  The 
privacy problem was not merely the fact that Pierce divulged his secret or that 
Doe himself had lost control over his information, but rather that the 
 
information are matters of public record”); Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 
207 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding no right to privacy for disclosure of information in police 
reports).  In an important case before Whalen, a district court held that there was no 
constitutional violation for New York to sell its motor vehicle records since these were 
public.  “What the State has done in practical effect is to tap a small source of much-needed 
revenue by offering a convenient ‘packaging’ service.”  Lamont v. Comm’r of Motor 
Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
230. 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995). 
231. Id. at 1136. 
232. Id. at 1139-40. 
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information appeared to be entirely out of anyone’s control.  Doe was in a 
situation similar to that of Joseph K. —waiting endlessly for the final verdict.  
He was informed that information about him had been collected; he knew that 
his employer had been investigating; but the process seemed to be taking place 
out of his sight.  To some extent, he experienced the desperation that Joseph K. 
experienced—knowing that information about him was out there in the hands 
of others and that these people were in fact doing something with that 
information, but having no participation in the process. 
Understanding the database privacy problem in terms of the Kafka 
metaphor illustrates that the problem with databases concerns the use of 
information, not merely keeping it secret.  Information about an individual is 
often not secret, but is diffused in the minds of a multitude of people and 
scattered in various documents and computer files across the country.  Few 
would be embarrassed by the disclosure of much of the material they read, the 
food they eat, or the products they purchase.  Few would view their race, 
ethnicity, marital status, or religion as confidential.  Of course, databases may 
contain the residue of scandals and skeletons—illicit websites, racy books, 
stigmatizing diseases—but since information in databases is rarely publicized, 
few reputations are tarnished.  For the most part, the data is processed 
impersonally by computers without ever being viewed by the human eye.  
Much of the privacy as secrecy conception focuses on breach of confidentiality, 
harmed reputation, and unwanted publicity.  But since these harms are not 
really the central problems of databases, privacy law often concludes that the 
information in databases is not private and is thus not entitled to protection.  
Indeed, one commentator defended DoubleClick’s tracking of web browsing 
habits by stating: 
Over time, people will realize it’s not Big Brother who’s going to show up [at] 
your door in a black ski mask and take your kids away or dig deep into your 
medical history.  This is a situation where you are essentially dropped into a 
bucket with 40 million people who look and feel a lot like you do to the 
advertising company.233 
This commentator, viewing privacy with the Big Brother metaphor, focuses on 
the wrong types of harms and implicitly views only secret information as 
private. 
The problem with databases concerns the uses and practices associated 
with our information, not merely whether that information remains completely 
secret.  Although disclosure can be a violation of privacy, this does not mean 
that avoiding disclosure is the sum and substance of our interest in privacy.  
What people want when they demand privacy with regard to their personal 
information is the ability to ensure that the information about them will be used 
only for the purposes they desire.  Even regarding the confidentiality of 
 
233. John Schwartz, DoubleClick Takes It on the Chin; New Privacy Lawsuit Looms; 
Stock Price Drops, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2000, at  E1 (quoting Dana Sherman). 
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information, the judicial understanding of privacy as secrecy fails to recognize 
that individuals want to keep things private from some people but not others. 
The fact that an employee criticizes her boss to a co-worker does not mean that 
she desires that her boss know her comments.  We often expect privacy even 
when in public.  Not all activities are purely private in the sense that they occur 
in isolation and in hidden corners.  When we talk in a restaurant, we do not 
expect to be listened to.  A person may buy condoms or hemorrhoid medication 
in a store open to the public, but certainly expects these purchases to be private 
activities.  Contrary to the judicial notion that any information in public records 
cannot be private, there is a considerable loss of privacy by plucking inaccessible 
facts buried in some obscure document and broadcasting them to the world on 
the evening news.  In short, the problem as understood by the Big Brother 
metaphor views the harm in the inhibitory effects of surveillance or in having 
one’s hidden world uncovered or invaded.  The problem as understood by the 
Kafka metaphor views the harm as “control out of control.”  Privacy can be 
invaded even if no secrets are revealed and even if nobody is watching us. 
In its privacy legislation, Congress has sometimes looked beyond the old 
paradigm of privacy as protecting one’s hidden world, although its privacy 
statutes often have failed to address the problem adequately.  Since the 1970s, 
Congress has grappled with the problem of databases, but has been slow to take 
action.234  Unlike the European Union, which adopted a general directive 
providing for large-scale privacy protection,235 the United States has not 
enacted measures of similar scope.  Instead, Congress has passed a series of 
statutes narrowly tailored to specific privacy problems. 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) of 1970,236 which regulates the 
information use practices of credit reporting companies, fails to adequately 
restrict secondary uses and disclosures of that information.  Although inspired by 
allegations of abuse and lack of responsiveness of credit agencies,237 the FCRA 
was severely weakened due to the effective lobbying of the credit-reporting 
industry.238 The FCRA permits credit reporting companies to sell the “credit 
header” portion of credit histories (which contains names, addresses, former 
addresses, telephone number, Social Security number, employment 
 
234. See REGAN, supra note 4, at xi-xii. 
235. Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe on the Protection 
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data (1995), reprinted in M ARC ROTENBERG, THE PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK: UNITED 
STATES LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 219-45 (1999) [hereinafter 
Directive].  For an excellent analysis of the Directive, see PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. 
LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE 
EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1998).  The Directive became effective on October 25, 
1998.  Id. at 2. 
236. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2001). 
237. SMITH, supra note 176, at 23. 
238. REGAN, supra note 4, at 101. 
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information, and birthdate) to various commercial entities.239  The FCRA does 
little to equalize the unbalanced power relationship between individuals and 
credit reporting companies. 
Congress’ most significant piece of privacy legislation in the 1970s—the 
Privacy Act of 1974240—regulates the collection and use of rec ords by federal 
agencies, giving individuals the right to access and correct information held by 
federal agencies.241  The Privacy Act was a good beginning, but it remains 
incomplete.  The Privacy Act is limited only to the public sector, having no 
applicability to the use of databases by marketers.  The Act applies only to 
federal, not state and local agencies. 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”),242 also 
known as the “Buckley Amendment,” regulates the accessibility of student 
records. FERPA remains quite narrow, only applying to a subset of records in 
one limited context (i.e., education).  Excluded are records maintained by school 
law enforcement officials243 and health and psychological records.244 
The Cable Communications Policy Act (“CCPA”) of 1984245 requires cable 
operators to inform subscribers about the nature and uses of personal information 
collected.246  The law prohibits any disclosure that reveals the subscriber’s 
viewing habits,247 and it is enforced with a private cause of action.248  The 
statute, however, applies only to cable operators and it has a broad exception 
where personal data can be disclosed for a “legitimate business activity.”249  
Nevertheless, the CCPA is an important first step in giving consumers control 
over their cable records. 
In 1986, Congress modernized wiretapping and eavesdropping laws when it 
passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) of 1986.250  The 
ECPA extends the protections of the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968251 to new 
forms of voice, data, and video communications, including cellular phones, and 
email or other computer transmissions.  The ECPA restricts the interception of 
 
239. See Gindin, supra note 84, at 1157. 
240. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (2000) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2001)). 
241. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d). 
242. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000)). 
243. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii) (2000). 
244. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv). 
245. § 551 (2000). 
246. § 551(a)(1). 
247. § 551(c)(2)(C)(ii). 
248. § 551(f)(1). 
249. § 551(c)(2)(A). 
250. 18 U.S.C §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2709, 2711 (2000). 
251. In 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (commonly referred to as “Title III” or “The Federal 
Wiretap Act”).  This law “nationalized the law of federal, state and private electronic 
surveillance of conversations.” TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 194, at 229. 
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transmitted communications252 and the searching of stored communic ations.253  
The focus of the law, which draws heavily from the Big Brother metaphor, is on 
eavesdropping and monitoring of communications; the ECPA does not otherwise 
limit the collection and use of personal data.  Furthermore, providers of Internet 
services are exempted from the ECPA and are free to examine the email of their 
subscribers.254 
After reporters obtained Supreme Court Justice nominee Robert Bork’s 
video cassette rental data, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act 
(“VPPA”) of 1988,255 which has become known as the “Bork Bill.”  The VPPA 
prohibits video tape service providers from knowingly disclosing personal 
information, such as titles of video cassettes rented or purchased, without the 
individual’s written consent.256  The VPPA creates a private cause of action only 
for knowing disclosures in violation of its terms.257  The statute, however, 
permits the disclosure of the subject matter of video rentals to marketers.258  The 
VPPA only applies to video cassette tapes,259 and no similar restrictions are 
placed on bookstores, record stores, or any other type of retailer, magazine 
producer, or catalog company. 
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) of 1991260 permits 
individuals to sue a telemarketer for damages up to five hundred dollars for 
each call received after requesting not to be called again.261  If the telemarketer 
knowingly broke the law, then the penalty is trebled.262  The TCPA, however, 
aims at redressing the aggravation of disruptive phone calls, and it does not 
govern the collection, use, or sale of personal data. 
In 1994, Congress finally addressed the longstanding practice of many 
states of selling personal information in their motor vehicle records to 
marketers.263  The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (“DPPA”)264 limits 
this practice, forcing states to acquire a driver’s consent before disclosing 
 
252. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). 
253. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-10 (2000). 
254. See Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996) (“§ 
2701(c)(1) allows service providers to do as they wish when it comes to accessing 
communications in electronic storage.”). 
255. Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195, (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-11 (2000)). 
256. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2000). 
257. §§ 2710(b)(1), (c)(1). 
258. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D)(ii). 
259. §§ 2710(a)(4), (b). 
260. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394, (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000)). 
261. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (2000). 
262. Id. 
263. For more information about the sale of motor vehicle information by states, see 
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Governments Find Information Pays, WASH. POST,  Mar. 9, 1998, at 
A1. 
264. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000). 
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personal information to marketers.265  Although the DPPA is an important step 
in controlling government disclosures of personal information to the private 
sector, it applies only in the context of motor vehicle records.  States are not 
limited in disclosing information contained in the numerous other forms of 
records they maintain. 
In 1996, Congress finally addressed the issue of health privacy in the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) of 1996.266 HIPPA 
required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate 
regulations to govern the privacy of medical records.267  HHS issued regulations 
which, among other things, require authorization for all uses and disclosures 
beyond those for treatment, payment, or health care operation (such as for 
marketing purposes).268 
The first federal law directly addressing privacy in cyberspace, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”) of 1998,269 regulates the 
collection of children’s personal information on the Internet.270 Websites 
targeted at children must post privacy policies271 and must obtain “parental 
consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from 
children.”272  But the law’s reach is limited.  The COPPA applies only to “an 
operator of any website or online service directed to children, . . . or the 
operator . . . that has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information 
from a child.”273 Moreover, the law applies only to website operators who collect 
personal information from children under age thirteen.274 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,275 permits banks, insurers, and 
investment companies that are affiliated to share the “nonpublic personal 
information” that each affiliate possesses.  Affiliates must tell customers that they 
 
265. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(12).The statute was recently upheld by the Supreme 
Court against a federalism challenge. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
266. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
267. 110 Stat. at 2033-34. 
268. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a).  The regulations do not permit health care entities to 
condition the provision of treatment or eligibility for benefits on the individual’s 
authorization of such uses of personal information.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(iv).  The 
regulations were finalized at the end of the Clinton Administration.  Although the Bush 
Administration initially criticized the regulations and vowed to delay their implementation, 
see Robert Pear, White House Plans to Revise New Medical Privacy Rules , N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
8, 2001, at 22, the Administration recently announced that the regulations would go into 
effect but would be modified at a later date.  Robert Pear, Bush Accepts Rules to Guard 
Privacy of Medical Records, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2001, at A1. 
269. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2000). 
270. § 6502(a)(1). 
271. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i). 
272. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
273. § 6502(b)(1)(A). 
274. § 6501(1). 
275. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 
(2001)). 
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are sharing this information, but there is no way for individuals to block this 
sharing of information.  People can only opt-out of the disclosure of their data to 
third parties.276  Given the large conglomerates of today’s corporate world, 
affiliate sharing is significant.  For example, Experian, one of the three largest 
credit reporting companies, was purchased by Great Universal Stores, a British 
retail corporation, which also acquired Metromail, Inc., a direct-marketing 
company.277  Further, the Act applies only to “nonpublic” information, and much 
of the information aggregated in databases (such as one’s name, address, and the 
like) are traditionally considered to be public. 
In sum, the federal laws are a start, but they often misapprehend the nature of 
the problem because they give people only a very limited form of control over 
only some of their information and often impose no system of default control on 
other holders of such information.  Although the statutes help in containing the 
spread of information, they often fail to adequately address the underlying power 
relationships and contain broad exceptions and loopholes that limit their 
effectiveness. 
Furthermore, the federal statutes cover only a small geography of the 
database problem.  They form a complicated patchwork of regulation with 
signif icant gaps and omissions.  For example, federal regulation covers federal 
agency records, educational records, cable television records, video rental 
records, and state motor vehicle records, but it does not cover most records 
maintained by state and local officials, as well as a host of other records held 
by libraries, charities, and merchants (i.e., supermarkets, department stores, 
mail order catalogs, bookstores, and the like).  The COPPA protects the privacy 
of children under thirteen on the Internet, but there is no protection for adults.  
As Colin Bennett observes, “[t]he approach to making privacy policy in the 
United States is reactive rather than anticipatory, incremental rather than 
comprehensive, and fragmented rather than coherent.  There may be a lot of 
laws, but there is not much protection.”278 
Second, in practice many of Congress’ laws are difficult to enforce.  It is 
often difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to find out if information has 
been disclosed.  A person who begins receiving unsolicited marketing mail and 
email may have a clue that some entity has disclosed her personal information, 
but that person often will not be able to discover what entity was the culprit.  
Indeed, the trade in personal information is a clandestine underworld, one that is 
not exposed sufficiently by federal privacy regulation to enable effective 
enforcement. 
In short, the Kafka metaphor illustrates that the problem runs deeper than 
 
276. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a), (b) (2001). 
277. See SMITH, supra note 30, at 327. 
278. Colin J. Bennett, Convergence Revisited: Toward a Global Policy for the 
Protection of Personal Data?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 99, 113 
(Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997). 
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disclosure and that at the core it concerns “control out of control”—the fact that 
our personal information is not only out of our control but also is often placed 
within a bureaucratic process that lacks control and discipline in handling and 
using such information.  Although the federal statutes are better at addressing this 
problem than the privacy torts, the constitutional right to information privacy, or 
the Fourth Amendment, they remain severely limited. 
B.   Misgivings of the Market 
The implications of depicting the privacy problem of databases with the 
Kafka metaphor go further than throwing into question the conception of 
privacy underlying most of privacy law.  The implications suggest that the 
existing solutions advocated by the discourse on information privacy are 
inadequate to deal with the problem.  In this Part, I analyze and critique the 
solutions advocated by the discourse, solutions which are predominantly 
market-based, relying on property rights or contractual defaults to regulate the 
flow of information.  As I argue, understanding the problem in terms of the 
Kafka metaphor highlights the shortcomings of the market-based solutions 
currently being advocated and suggests new directions for the law. 
Perhaps the most appropriate notion of privacy for databases is that of 
“control of personal information,” one of the most dominant conceptions of 
privacy.279  In the most famous formulation of this concept, Alan Westin 
declared:  “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others.”280  Numerous other scholars embrace this 
definition.281  Arthur Miller declared that “the basic attribute of an effective 
 
279. One commentator has referred to the conception of privacy as “control over 
information about oneself” as the “classic notion” of privacy.  JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN 
PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 24 (1997). 
280. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, supra note 120, at 7. 
281. See, e.g.,  ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1 (1970) 
(Privacy is “the individual’s right to control dissemination of information about himself.”); 
Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 
1810-1990, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1992) (“I will advance a concept of privacy based 
on the individual’s control of information. . . .”); Oscar M. Ruebhausen & Orville G. Brim, 
Jr., Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1189 (1965) (“The essence 
of privacy is no more, and certainly no less, than the freedom of the individual to pick and 
choose for himself the time and circumstances under which, and most importantly, the extent 
to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions are to be shared with or withheld from 
others.”).  Anne Wells Branscomb, in a recently published book, focuses almost exclusively 
on the importance of control over information for privacy.  See BRANSCOMB, supra note 81.  
Even in 1890, Warren and Brandeis appear at one point to intimate a control over 
information conception of privacy:  “The common law secures to each individual the right of 
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be 
communicated to others. . . . [E]ven if he has chosen to give them expression, he generally 
retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given them.” Warren & 
Brandeis, supra note 189, at 198. 
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right to privacy is the individual’s ability to control the circulation of 
information relating to him.”282  According to Charles Fried, “Privacy is not 
simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is 
the control we have over information about ourselves.”283  Similar to Westin, 
Miller, and Fried, President Clinton’s Information Infrastructure Task Force 
defined privacy as “an individual’s claim to control the terms under which 
personal information—information identifiable to an individual—is acquired, 
disclosed, and used.”284  The Supreme Court has even echoed this conception 
by stating that privacy “encompass[es] the individual’s control of information 
concerning his or her person.”285 
Theorists who view privacy as control over information frequently 
understand it within the framework of property and contract concepts.  This is 
not the only way control can be understood, but the leading commentators 
often define control in terms of ownership—as a form of property right in 
information.286  Understood in such terms, control over something entails a 
bundle of legal rights of ownership, such as rights of possession, alienability, 
exclusion of others, commercial exploitation, and so on.287  This is what leads 
Westin to conclude: “[P]ersonal information, thought of as the right of decision 
over one’s private personality, should be defined as a property right. . . .”288  
The market discourse focuses the debate around who should own certain kinds 
of information as well as what the appropriate contractual rules should be for 
trading personal information. 
Although some might argue that personal information is owned by the 
individual to whom it pertains based on a natural rights theory or some form of 
inherent connection, many commentators who approach privacy in terms of 
property rights assign initial entitlements instrumentally.  They claim that the 
market will achieve the ideal amount of privacy by balancing the value of 
personal information to a company (i.e., its commercial value in the 
marketplace) against the value of the information to the individual and the 
 
282. M ILLER, supra note 45, at 25. 
283. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968). 
284. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE: PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL 
INFORMATION (June 6, 1995), available at http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/ipc/ipc-
pubs/niiprivprin_final.html. 
285. United States v. Reporters’ Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 
(1989). 
286. See Litman, supra note 212, at 1287 (“The proposal that has been generating the 
most buzz, recently, is the idea that privacy can be cast as a property right.”); Pamela 
Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. RE V. 1125, 1132 (2000) (“In 
recent years, a number of economists and legal commentators have argued that the law ought 
now to grant individuals property rights in their personal data.”). 
287. See Litman, supra note 212, at 1295 (“The raison d’etre of property is 
alienability. . . .”). 
288. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, supra note 120, at 324. 
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larger social value of having the information within the individual’s control.289  
The role of law is to assign the initial entitlements.  Thus, the debate in this 
discourse centers around who should own certain kinds of information.290 
In addition to discussing how the initial entitlements to information should 
be assigned, the debate also focuses on the basic contractual default rules for 
the sale or transfer of personal information.  Contractual default rules are the 
initial set of rules that regulate market transactions.  These rules are merely a 
starting point; they govern only when the parties to a transaction do not 
negotiate for a different set of rules.  As Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner explain, 
“default rules” are rules “that parties can contract around by prior agreement” 
while “immutable rules” (or inalienablity rules) are rules that “parties cannot 
change by contractual agreement.”291  Most market proponents favor default 
rules that can be bargained around. 
Market solution proponents are certainly not in agreement over the types of 
property entitlements and contractual default rules that should be required.  
Some—especially people in the database industry—argue that the market is 
functioning optimally and is already adequately accounting for privacy 
concerns.292  According to this argument, there are market incentives for 
companies to keep their data secret and to be honest about their data collection.  
There have been a number of instances where companies have canceled various 
initiatives due to public outcry over privacy.  For example, in response to 
privacy concerns, Yahoo! eliminated the reverse telephone number search from 
its People Search site.293 In the early 1990s, in response to a public outcry, 
Lotus Corporation scrapped plans to sell a database containing the names, 
addresses, income brackets, and lifestyle data of 120 million citizens.294  In 
1996, Lexis-Nexis announced its P-TRAK Personal Locator which would 
provide addresses, maiden names, and Social Security numbers of millions of 
people.  After an intensive 10-day outcry by Internet users, Lexis-Nexis 
 
289. See, e.g., JOHN HAGEL III & M ARC SINGER, NET WORTH: SHAPING M ARKETS 
WHEN CONSUMERS M AKE THE RULES 19-20 (1999) (advocating for an “infomediary” 
between consumers and vendors who would broker information to companies in exchange 
for money and goods to the consumer); Paul Farhi, Me Inc.: Getting the Goods on 
Consumers, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1999, at H1. 
290. See, e.g., BRANSCOMB, supra note 81. 
291. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertnert, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989). 
292. See Privacy in Commercial World, 106th Cong. (2001) (statement of Paul H. 
Rubin, Professor of Law and Economics, Emory University School of Law), available at 
http://www.house.gov/commerce/hearings/0301200143/Rubin66.htm.; Direct Marketing 
Ass’n, Inc., Consumer Privacy Comments Concerning the Direct Marketing Association 
Before the Federal Trade Commission (July 16, 1997); FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 113 (1997). 
293. Gindin, supra note 87, at 1160. 
294. LARSON, supra note 36, at 9-10; see also SYKES, supra note 47, at 32; Gindin, 
supra note 87, at 1160; Lawrence M. Fisher, New Data Base Ended by Lotus and Equifax, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1991, at D4. 
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canceled its plans.295  In 1997, AOL canceled its plans to sell customers’ phone 
numbers to direct marketing firms.296 
According to market purists, to the extent that consumers want their 
privacy protected, the market will respond to this demand and appropriately 
balance it against other interests.  The fact that privacy is not afforded much 
protection demonstrates that people value other things more than privacy—
such as efficient and convenient transactions.  Furthermore, people want 
targeted marketing and enjoy receiving information about products more 
tailored to their wants and tastes. 
Moreover, due to consumer worries over privacy, companies have 
increasingly been adopting privacy policies, which operate as a form of notice 
as to how information will be used and a contractual promise limiting the 
future uses of the information.297  Finally, the argument goes, in many 
contexts, the market is already treating personal information as a property right 
owned by individuals.  The exchange of personal information for something of 
value is already beginning to take place.  Many web sites require people to 
supply personal information in order to gain access to information on the web 
site.  Under the market approach, this practice can be justified as an 
information trade. 298  In order to receive such services as book 
recommendations, software upgrades, free email, and personal web pages, 
users must relinquish personal information not knowing its potential uses.  In 
short, useful information and services are being exchanged for personal 
information, and this represents the going “price” of privacy. 
Other market-solution proponents are less sanguine.  They recognize 
problems in the existing market and argue that certain default contractual rules 
and property rights must be established in order to protect privacy.  For 
example, Richard Murphy claims that personal information, “like all 
information, is property.”299  “The assignment of the property right to the 
 
295. SYKES, supra note 47, at 31-32. 
296. Id. at 32. 
297. In 1997, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) reviewed 100 of the 
most frequently visited web sites.  Almost half of the websites collected personal data; 
however, only seventeen sites had explicit privacy policies. See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY 
INFORMATION CENTER, REPORT: SURFER BEWARE: PERSONAL PRIVACY AND THE INTERNET 
(June 1997), available at http://www.epic.org. None of the sites using cookies informed the 
user that information about the user was being placed on the user’s system.  See id.  In 1999, 
a study by the Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey of 361 sites revealed that over 
90% collected personal information, with over half collecting demographic information. 
GEORGETOWN INTERNET PRIVACY POLICY SURVEY: REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N 
6 (June 1999), available at http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/gippshome.html.  Of the 
sites that collected personal information, 65.9% posted some form of privacy policy.  Id.  
Although these two studies involved a different group of sites, they reflect a trend:  more 
personal information is being collected and more sites are posting privacy policies. 
298. For a justification of this practice, see Justin Matlick, Don’t Restrain Trade in 
Information, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at A22. 
299. Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic 
Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383-84 (1996). 
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information,” observes Murphy, “is a question of contract, either explicit 
contract, or in the absence of express terms, implied contract.”300  Murphy 
engages in an instrumental analysis of privacy, determining that “there are, 
also, substantial economic benefits to personal privacy”301—benefits which 
might in many cases outweigh the value of the information to a third party.  He 
concludes that in many instances, contractual default rules mandating that 
personal information not be disclosed are more efficient than a default rule 
permitting disclosure.302 
Likewise, Jerry Kang views personal information as a form of property and 
advocates for a market solution.303  He recognizes that there are compelling 
non-market perceptions of privacy that view privacy as a human value and that 
this way of understanding privacy is “poorly translated, if at all, into efficiency 
terms.”304 “This approach,” observes Kang, “would view the right to privacy as 
less like a property right—which we comfortably peddle away in the 
marketplace—and more like a civil or human right.”305  Nevertheless, he 
favors the market approach, since the human rights approach suggests adopting 
inalienability rules, which “risk[] surrendering control over information privacy 
to the state.”306  Kang recognizes that merely assigning a default rule as to the 
ownership in information is insufficient.  Kang concludes that it is not efficient 
for individuals to have to find out what information about them is collected and 
how it is used.307  Thus, he advocates a contractual default rule that “personal 
information may be processed in only functionally necessary ways” and that 
parties are “free to contract around the default rule.”308  Kang claims that 
inalienability rules would be too paternalistic.  “[C]ontrol is at the heart of 
information privacy,” he claims, and control means that individuals should be 
able to sell or disclose their information if they desire.309  Inalienability rules 
will risk “surrendering control over information privacy to the state.”310  
Although Kang clearly recognizes the problems of translating personal 
information into a form of personal property, the effects of his market solution 
force such a translation.  His solution creates a property right in personal 
information through a contractual default rule that limits the way personal  
 
300. Id. at 2402. 
301. Id. at 2416. 
302. Id. 
303. Kang,  supra note 136, at 1267. 
304. Id. at 1260. 
305. Id. at 1266. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 1256-57. 
308. Id. at 1268. 
309. Id. at 1266.  To be fair, Kang is not absolutist in this view, and recognizes that in 
some limited circumstances (emergency room data), inalienability rules are preferable.  See 
id. at n.302. 
310. Id. 
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information is used after being transferred to another. 
Lawrence Lessig also advocates a market approach.  He argues that a 
property regime permits each individual to decide for herself what information 
to give out and “protects both those who value their privacy more than others 
and those who value it less. . . .”311  Lessig notes that our existing system of 
posting privacy policies and enabling consumers to opt in or out has high 
transaction costs because people do not have “the time or patience to read 
through cumbersome documents describing obscure rules for controlling 
data.”312  Therefore, Lessig recommends that computer software be crafted to 
act akin to an “electronic butler,” negotiating our privacy concerns:  “The user 
sets her preferences once—specifies how she would negotiate privacy and what 
she is willing to give up—and from that moment on, when she enters a site, the 
site and her machine negotiate.  Only if the machines can agree will the site be 
able to obtain her personal data.”313  In other words, Lessig offers a 
technological implementation for a market system where people have property 
rights in their information. 
Similarly, Judge Richard Posner translates control of information into 
property concepts, but with much different results than Murphy, Kang, and 
Lessig.314  Posner views privacy as a form of withholding true information 
from the marketplace.  He views privacy law as typically concerning the 
question “whether a person should have a right to conceal discreditable facts 
about himself. . . .” 315  “The economist sees a parallel to the efforts of sellers 
to conceal defects in their products.”316 Society should provide individuals a 
property right in true information about themselves when it will foster more 
efficient transactions.317  With regard to list renting, Posner argues that “the 
costs of obtaining subscriber approval would be high relative to the value of the 
list.”318  “If, therefore, we believe that these lists are generally worth more to 
the purchasers than being shielded from possible unwanted solicitations is 
worth to subscribers, we should assign the property right to the magazine; and 
the law does this.”319 
Understanding the privacy problem of databases in terms of the Kafka 
metaphor reveals that there are several deficiencies in the market solution.  The 
argument that the market is already providing the optimal level of privacy 
protection fails because there are vast inequalities in knowledge and much data 
collection is clandestine.  Despite the few instances where information 
 
311. LAWRENCE  LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 161 (1999). 
312. Id. at 160. 
313. Id. 
314. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, 233 (1981). 
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collection initiatives were canceled due to public complaints over privacy, 
many new ambitious information collection endeavors occur outside of the 
public eye.  At any given time, one of thousands of companies or government 
agencies could decide on a new use of information or on a new form of 
collection.  People should not always have to be ready to mount a large 
campaign any time such an eruption could occur.  Many of the activities of the 
database industry are not well known to the public, and will remain that way 
under default notions of corporate privacy and trade secrets unless something is 
changed.  Ironically, corporate bureaucracies sometimes have more privacy 
rights than individuals. 
Although more companies that routinely collect and use personal 
information are posting privacy policies, these policies hardly amount to a 
meaningful contract.  Rather, privacy policies tend to be self-indulgent, making 
vague promises such as the fact that a company will be careful with data; that it 
will respect privacy; that privacy is its number one concern.  These public -
relations statements are far from reliable and are often phrased in a vague, self-
aggrandizing manner to make the corporation look good.  What is not given to 
consumers is a frank and detailed description of what will and will not be done 
with their information, of what specific information security measures are 
being taken, of what specific rights of recourse consumers have.  People must 
rely on the good graces of companies that possess their data to keep it secure 
and to prevent its abuse.  They have no say in how much money and effort will 
be allocated to security; no say in which employees get access; and no say in 
what steps are taken to ensure that unscrupulous employees do not steal or 
misuse their information.  Instead, privacy policies only vaguely state that they 
will treat information securely.  Specific measures are not described, and 
individuals have no control over those measures. 
Most privacy policies have no way to prevent changes in policy or a 
binding enforcement mechanism.  Although the Direct Marketing Association 
(DMA) maintains standards for self-regulation, polls suggest that less than 
twenty-five percent of DMA members will adhere to self-regulatory 
practices.320  One employee at a bank stated:  “We joke about it all the time 
because we officially say that we don’t reveal information and we treat it with 
the utmost respect.  What a crock.  I hear people laughing in the elevator about 
credit reports they’ve pulled!”321 
Frequently, companies change their privacy policies, making it even more 
difficult for an individual to keep track.  Yahoo!’s privacy policy indicates that 
it “may change from time to time, so please check back periodically.”322  AOL 
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321. SMITH, supra note 176, at 80. 
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recently told its subscribers that their privacy preferences had expired and that 
if they did not fill out a new opt-out form, then their personal information 
would be distributed to marketers and other parties.323  Further, personal 
information databases can be sold to other businesses with less protective 
privacy policies, especially when a company goes bankrupt and its database is 
among its largest assets.324 
Even market approaches favoring a more pro-privacy regime of contractual 
default rules neglect to account for the core of the database problem as 
illustrated by the Kafka metaphor—the power inequalities that pervade the 
world of information transfers between individuals and bureaucracies. 
A market approach has difficulty assigning the proper value to personal 
information.  It is difficult for the individual to adequately value specific pieces 
of personal information.  The value of one’s Social Security number lies not in 
its intimacy, not in its immediate revelations of selfhood, and not in the fact 
that the individual has authored it or given it special valu e.  Rather, the value is 
in the power of this number over the individual; the ability it provides to others 
to gain power and control over an individual, to invade an individual’s private 
life, to make the individual vulnerable to fraud, identity theft, prying, snooping, 
and the like.  Because this value is linked to uncertain future uses, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, for an individual to adequately value her information.  Since 
the ownership model involves individuals relinquishing full title to the 
information, they have little idea how such information will be used when in 
the hands of others. 
Furthermore, the aggregation problem severely complicates the valuation 
process.  An individual may give out bits of information in different contexts, 
each transfer appearing innocuous.  However, the information can be 
aggregated and could prove to be invasive of the private life when combined 
with other information.  It is the totality of information about a person and how 
it is used that poses the greatest threat to privacy.  As Julie Cohen notes, “[a] 
comprehensive collection of data about an individual is vastly more than the 
sum of its parts.”325  From the standpoint of each particular information 
transaction, individuals will not have enough facts to make a truly informed 
decision.  The potential future uses of that information are too vast and 
unknown to enable individuals to make the appropriate valuation. 
Further, the value of the information cannot merely be measured from the 
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individual’s perspective.  As Byford aptly observes, assigning property rights 
in information “values privacy only to the extent it is considered to be of 
personal worth by the individual who claims it.”326  This method of valuation 
is too individualistic, ascribing value to information solely upon the sentiments 
of the individual.  Thus, the value of privacy is not located in particular 
information and defined by the individuals to whom that information pertains; 
rather the value of privacy lies in its systemic effects on power and 
powerlessness in society. 
These inadequacies with a property rights solution are manifested in Dwyer 
v. American Express Co.327  American Express cardholders sued American 
Express for renting their names to merchants under both invasion of privacy 
and misappropriation.  The court held that by using the credit card, “a 
cardholder is voluntarily, and necessarily, giving information to defendants 
that, if analyzed, will reveal a cardholder’s spending habits and shopping 
preferences.”328  Thus, there was no invasion of privacy.  As for 
misappropriation, the court reasoned: 
Undeniably, each cardholder’s name is valuable to defendants.  The more 
names included on a list, the more that list will be worth.  However, a single, 
random cardholder’s name has little or no intrinsic value to defendants (or a 
merchant).  Rather, an individual name has value only when it is associated 
with one of defendants’ lists.  Defendants create value by categorizing and 
aggregating these names.  Furthermore, defendants’ practices do not deprive 
any of the cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.329 
This case indicates what is omitted when information privacy is reduced to 
property rights in information.  The court struggled with the fact that the 
information was shared and that value was not created by the individuals alone.  
The court only focused on the value of the information to each individual, not 
on the systemic harms that American Express’ practices contributed to—
namely, the powerlessness of the individuals to have any meaningful control 
over information pertaining to their personal lives.  The problem with databases 
is not that information collectors fail to compensate people for the proper value 
of personal information.  The problem is people’s lack of control, their lack of 
knowledge about how it will be used in the future, and their lack of 
participation in the process.  It is not merely sufficient to allow people to sell 
their information, relinquish all title to it and allow companies to use it as they 
see fit.  This provides people with an all-or-nothing type of exchange, which 
they are likely to take when they are unaware of how information can or might 
be used in the future.  Nor is it enough to attach some default contractual rights 
to information transactions such as nondisclosure obligations or a requirement 
of notification when a future use of information is employed.  These solutions 
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cannot work effectively in a situation where the power relationship and 
information distribution between individuals and public and private 
bureaucracies is so greatly unbalanced.  In other words, the problem with 
market solutions is not merely that it is difficult to commodify information 
(which it is), but also that a regime of default rules alone (consisting of 
property rights in information and contractual defaults) will not enable fair and 
equitable market transactions in personal information. 
A market solution will also experience difficulty because information 
transactions are often grossly unfair and unequal.  As Peter Swire observes, it is 
difficult for consumers to bargain with large corporations about their privacy 
because they lack expertise in privacy issues and it takes substantial time and 
effort.330  Information collection is duplicitous, clandestine, and often coerced. 
The law currently does not provide meaningful ability to refuse to consent to 
relinquish information.  The FCRA, for example, mandates that individuals 
consent before an employer can obtain their credit report.  According to Joel 
Reidenberg: “Frequently, individuals will be asked to sign blanket consent 
statements authorizing inquiry into credit reporting agency files and disclosures 
of information for any purpose.  These consents rarely identify the credit 
reporting agencies or all the uses to which the personal information will be 
put.”331  This consent is virtually meaningless.  When people seek medical 
care, among the forms they sign are general consent forms which permit the 
disclosure of one’s medical records to anyone with a need to see them.  Giving 
people property rights or default contract rules is not sufficient to address the 
problem because it does not address the underlying power inequalities that 
govern information transactions.  Unless these are addressed, any privacy 
protections will merely be “contracted” around, in ways not meaningful either 
to the problem or to the contract notions supposedly justifying such a solution.  
People will be given consent forms with vague fine-print discussions of the 
contractual default privacy rules that they are waiving, and they will sign them 
without thought.  As Julie Cohen correctly contends, “[f]reedom of choice in 
markets requires accurate information about choices and other consequences, 
and enough power—in terms of wealth, numbers, or control over resources—to 
have choices.”332 
Due to the problems with ascribing a value to personal information and 
because privacy is an issue about societal structure involving our relationships 
with public and private bureaucracies, some form of regulation is necessary 
that exceeds the narrow measures proposed by proponents of a market solution.  
There are certain rights we cannot bargain away because they are not mere 
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individual possessions but are important for the structure of society as a whole. 
Inalienability rules do not necessarily have to limit a person’s ability to 
disclose or sell certain information; nor must they limit many forms of 
information collection.  These rules should focus on our relationships with 
bureaucracies, for unless these relationships are equalized, markets in 
information will not consist of fair, voluntary, and informed information 
transactions.  The problem with databases goes to the very structure of the 
information market itself.  I am not arguing that some form of market 
mechanism cannot work; rather, I am arguing that a precondition of a 
successful market is establishing rules governing our relationships with 
bureaucracies. 
C.  An Agenda for a Solution 
Some commentators argue that things have already progressed too far for 
law to curtail the collection and use of information.  Amitai Etzioni observes 
that “as long as Americans wish to enjoy the convenience of using credit cards 
and checks (as opposed to paying cash) and of ordering merchandise over the 
phone and the Internet (rather than shopping in person), they will leave data 
trails that are difficult to erase or conceal.”333  “To be realistic,” Etzioni states, 
“the probability of returning the genie to the bottle is nil.”334  In his recent 
book, The Transparent Society, David Brin echoes the same sentiment:  “[I]t is 
already far too late to prevent the invasion of cameras and databases.  The djinn 
cannot be crammed back into its bottle.”335  Brin suggests that we abandon 
privacy in favor of a transparent society, one where everything is out in the 
open, where we watch the watchers, where we have the power to monitor the 
elites—the politicians and the corporate leaders—just as much as they have the 
ability to monitor us.  We should thus regulate in favor of more laws such as 
the Freedom of Information Act to expose information held by government and 
corporations.  A truly transparent society would hold those who would violate 
our privacy accountable.336 
The difficulty with Brin’s solution is made manifest when the problem of 
databases is no longer seen as predominantly one of surveillance.  One aspect 
of the problem is that inequalities in power relationships are increased 
significantly by the use of databases.  The problem stems from a group of 
disempowering practices associated with databases.  Affording more mutuality 
of access to information will do little to alter this power imbalance because 
information is much more of an effective tool in the hands of a large 
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bureaucracy.  Information is not the key to power in the Information Age—
knowledge is.  Information consists of raw facts.  Knowledge is information 
that has been sifted, sorted, and analyzed.  The mere possession of information 
does not give one power; it is the ability to process that information and the 
capabilities to use the data that matters.  In order to solve the problem, a 
transparent society would have to make each individual as competent as 
bureaucratic organizations in processing information into knowledge. 
Therefore, a set of laws and rights is necessary to govern our relationship 
with bureaucracies.  These laws must consist of more than default rules that can 
be contracted around or property entitlements that can be bartered away.  The 
market-based solutions work within the existing market; the problem with 
databases is the very way that the market deals with personal information—a 
problem in the nature of the market itself that prevents fair and voluntary 
information transactions. 
First, in light of the revolution in accessibility provided by modern 
computer capabilities and the Internet, we must rethink the accessibility of the 
information in public records.  The privacy torts have been severely weakened 
by a series of Supreme Court decisions upholding First Amendment interests.  
As one commentator has observed, “the tort of invasion of privacy is probably 
best described as alive, but on life support.”337  In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn,338 the Court held that a state could not impose civil liability based upon 
publication of a rape victim’s name obtained from a court record.  In Smith v. 
Daily Mail Publishing Co.,339  the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the 
publication of the names of juvenile offenders.  In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,340 a 
newspaper that had published the name of a rape victim obtained from a 
publicly released police report successfully challenged a Florida law 
prohibiting the mass communication of the name of rape victims.  The 
Supreme Court held that the Florida law ran afoul of the First Amendment.  
“We hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it 
has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only 
when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order. . . .”341 
Given these First Amendment limitations, governments must rethink what 
records and information they make publicly available and which ones they 
refuse to make publicly available.  Currently, states vary in what information 
they make publicly available.  Death certificates are public in California but not 
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in New York.342  Often such decisions are made by agencies and bureaucrats.  
Certain records are considered confidential: tax, social welfare, criminal 
history.  Others are public: property records, birth, death, marriage certificates, 
court records, motor vehicle records, voter registration records.  The privacy 
case law neglects to examine the unlimited power of the government officials 
to determine what information is public.  People do not have much choice in 
refusing to supply much of the information in these records.  When records are 
made publicly available, access to them vastly increases.  As discussed earlier, 
a number of sites on the Internet are beginning to amass public records into 
central databases.343 
Second, courts must abandon the notion that privacy is limited to 
concealing or withholding information, and must begin to recognize that 
accessibility and uses of information—not merely disclosures of secrets—can 
threaten privacy.  In one context, the Court appeared to understand the 
necessity of breaking away from the privacy-as-secrecy model.  In United 
States v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,344 the Court held that the 
release of FBI rap sheets was an invasion of privacy within the privacy 
exemption of FOIA.  The FBI maintains rap sheets (which contain date of 
birth, physical description, and a history of arrests, charges, and convictions) 
on over twenty-four million people. 345  FOIA exempts law enforcement 
records that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.”346  The reporters claimed that the events 
summarized in the rap sheet had previously been publicly disclosed.  The Court 
rejected this argument: 
In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another 
divulged to another.  Thus, the extent of the protection accorded a privacy 
right at common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the 
allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it 
private. . . . Recognition of this attribute of a privacy interest supports the 
distinction, in terms of personal privacy, between scattered disclosure of the 
bits of information contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a 
whole.347 
The Court concluded, “Plainly there is a vast difference between the public 
records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county 
archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized 
summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”348 
In Reporters Committee, the Court properly departed from a privacy as 
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secrecy conception, understanding that it is the extent of publicity, not merely 
complete secrecy, that matters.  Unfortunately, this was one of the few 
instances in which the Court has done so.  Efforts to restrict the use of public 
information may run into First Amendment problems, and some difficult trade-
offs may have to be made between privacy and free expression (particularly in 
the form of commercial speech) as well as free access to public records.  In Los 
Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.,349 the Court 
began to address this issue when it upheld a California law that restricted 
targeted marketers from obtaining law enforcement records of the names and 
addresses of arrestees and crime victims.350  Rejecting a facial challenge that 
the law infringed upon commercial speech, the Court reasoned that the statute 
was not “prohibiting a speaker from conveying information that the speaker 
already possesses” but was merely “a governmental denial of access to 
information in its possession” which it was under no duty to disclose.351 
Third, the current self-regulatory and legislative solution of enabling 
people to opt out of having their data collected or disseminated is ineffectual.  
In an opt-out system, the default rule is that personal data can be collected and 
used unless the individual expressly states a preference not to have information 
collected or used.  Opt-out systems require individuals to check a box, send a 
letter, make a telephone call, or take other affirmative steps to indicate their 
preferences.  However, there are too many collectors of information for a 
reasonable right of opt-out to be effective.  Without a centralized mechanism 
for individuals to opt-out, individuals would have to spend much of their tim e 
guarding their privacy like a hawk. 
Opting-out is often time consuming and not very effective.  The Direct 
Marketing Association (“DMA”) establishes a Mail Preference System, by 
which consumers request the service to ask businesses to stop soliciting them.  
This is essentially a database of people who do not want to be in databases.  
The service records their preference, but does not remove their name from any 
list.352  The database is then sent to the subscribing companies so that they can 
stop mailings to those names.353  However, many people are unaware of this 
option, numerous companies are not members of the DMA, and many members 
fail to comply with DMA guidelines.  As Jeff Sovern argues, opt-out systems 
provide little incentive to companies to make opting-out easy; “companies will 
incur transaction costs in notifying consumers of the existence of the opt-out 
option and in responding to consumers who opt out.”354 
Indeed, as Sovern notes, the incentive for companies in an opt-out system 
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may in fact be to make opting-out more difficult for individuals.355  When 
companies and websites inform individuals of their ability to opt-out, their 
privacy policies are often vague, “overloaded” with extraneous information, 
and difficult to understand.356  Further, opt-out systems often provide 
individuals with an all-or-nothing choice:  either agree to all forms of 
information collection and use or to none whatsoever.  Such a limited set of 
choices does not permit individuals to express their preferences accurately. 
Individuals frequently consent to certain uses of their personal information, but 
they do not want to relinquish their information for all possible future uses.  A 
more complete range of choices must permit individuals to express their 
preferences for how information will be protected, how it will be used in the 
future, and with whom it will be shared. 
Thus, providing people with opt-out rights and privacy policies does little 
to give individuals much control over the information collected and used. 
Regulation mandating that consumers opt-in rather than opt-out will more 
effectively control the flow of information between unequal parties.  Under a 
system where individuals opt-in, the default rule is that personal information 
cannot be collected or used about an individual unless the individual provides 
consent.  As Sovern contends, an opt-in system will place the incentive on 
entities that use personal information to “make it as easy as possible for 
consumers to consent to the use of their personal information.”357  Even with 
an opt-in system, steps must be taken to ensure that consent amounts to more 
than a “notice and choice” system, which as Marc Rotenberg argues, “imagines 
the creation of perfect market conditions where consumers are suddenly 
negotiating over a range of uses for personal information.”358  This problem, 
which Julie Cohen terms the “privacy-as-choice model”359 and which Paul 
Schwartz terms the notion of “privacy-control,”360 emerges because of 
information inequalities between individuals and the bureaucracies that collect 
and use data, and because of an individual’s lack of meaningful choices over 
the uses of her personal information.361  As Schwartz aptly states:  “[W]hen 
faced with standardized terms, individuals left by privacy-control to fend 
for themselves will frequently accept whatever industry offers them.”362  
Therefore, effective privacy regulation must require an opt-in system which 
requires a meaningful range of choices as well as addresses inequalities in 
knowledge and power and other impediments  to voluntary and informed 
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consent. 
Fourth, regulation is necessary to ensure that the private sector undertakes 
adequate security measures.  Although frequently used by companies as 
passwords for access to sensitive personal records, an individual’s Social 
Security number and mother’s maiden name are not always private.  Birth 
records typically contain mothers’ maiden names, and they are public in every 
state.  Public records also contain Social Security numbers, such as lawsuit 
filings, bankruptcy records, death certificates, driving records, and lien 
documents.  Governments are keeping this information public despite the 
widespread practice of using such information to gain access to other, more 
personal information.  At the same time, governments are not doing anything to 
regulate what types of information companies can use as security passwords.  
As a result, there is little security over our personal information—which affects 
our professions, our finances, and our reputations. 
The European Union has taken steps more in line with the view of the 
database privacy problem in this Article.  In 1996, the European Union issued the 
European Community Directive on Data Protection,363 which outlines the basic 
principles for privacy legislation for European Union member countries.  
Although the Directive is far from perfect, it recognizes some of the dimensions 
of the problem that are neglected by United States’ privacy law.  For example, 
Article 15 provides: 
Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be subject to a 
decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects 
him and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to 
evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at 
work, creditwort hiness, reliability, conduct, etc.364 
Further, Article 8 prohibits, subject to a number of necessary exceptions, 
“the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the 
processing of data concerning health or sex life.”365  The two provisions of the 
Directive quoted above limit specific uses of information and address the 
problem of the way personal information is used to make important decisions 
affecting individual’s lives.  An exhaustive appraisal of the Directive is beyond 
the scope of this article, but the Directive contains important differences that 
should be considered by policy-makers in the United States.366  The Directive 
was influenced by the Fair Information Practices developed in 1973 by the 
United States Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW).  The HEW 
Code of Fair Information Practices articulated a number of basic information 
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privacy principles such as the transparency of personal data record-keeping 
systems; the right of the individual to access her records and to be informed of 
the uses of her personal information; the right of individuals to correct 
erroneous personal information in her records; the duty of entities holding 
records to ensure the reliability and safety of personal data; and the right of the 
individual to prevent personal information obtained for one purpose from being 
used for another purpose without his or her consent.367  The Fair Information 
Practices have, as Marc Rotenberg notes, “played a significant role in framing 
privacy laws in the United States,”368 and influenced privacy law around the 
world. Subsequent sets of information privacy principles, such as those of the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have 
expanded the Fair Information Practices.369  Unfortunately, in the United States 
the Fair Information Practices have only been selectively incorporated into 
various statutes in a limited number of contexts.  A more comprehensive 
incorporation of the Fair Information Practices, as developed by HEW and 
expanded upon by the OECD and the European Union Privacy Directive, 
would go far towards addressing the privacy problem as I have characterized it. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the problem with databases is one of power and 
bureaucracy.  The implications of this view are that certain solutions which 
appear adequate when viewed with other understandings of the problem in 
mind, are inadequate when one understands the problem as I have depicted it.  
The problem with databases is not our being watched, controlled, or inhibited.  
Nor is it our lack of ownership in our personal information.  Rather, it is a 
problem that involves power and the effects of our relationship with public and 
private bureaucracy—our inability to participate meaningfully in the collection 
and use of our personal information.  As a result, we must focus on the 
structure of power in modern society and how to govern such relationships with 
bureaucracies.  What is missing from the current debate is a focus on the 
effects of databases on our daily lives—the way that they are changing the way 
we think, judge, and decide. 
Solving the problem requires meaningful limits on how data can be used—
limits that are clear rather than ambiguous and amorphous.  It involves the 
basic guarantees to people that their information is being treated thoughtfully, 
that they are being treated with respect and dignity, that they are informed 
when they disclose information, and that they have meaningful partic ipation in 
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the use of the information.  This means more than an opt-out system, which 
requires too much vigilance and effort on the part of consumers and almost 
always provides them with a limited choice between blocking all uses of the 
information and enabling the unfettered use of that information.  It means that 
even when information is provided, it is not owned by its corporate collectors 
for any use they might devise.  It means that personal information cannot be 
bartered and sold like any other commodity. 
Too often, commentators and policy makers have been focusing on the 
wrong evils when addressing the database problem—a focus that has led to 
more apprehension than action.  Today, we are living a precarious existence, at 
the mercy of impersonal bureaucracies that have an unprecedented amount of 
power over us.  While we fear sinister motives and designs for social control, 
we neglect to see the harrowing world that is actually being created by the 
thoughtless and impersonal practices of bureaucracy.  That world is not merely 
a frightening possibility like Big Brother—it is more and more the world we 
are currently living in. 
 
